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NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN:
HOW THE CFTC IS USING VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES TO EXPAND ITS JURISDICTION
James Michael Blakemore*
INTRODUCTION
A decade has passed since Bitcoin solved a fundamental
problem plaguing virtual currencies:1 How to ensure, without resort to financial intermediaries or other trusted central authorities,
that a unit of digital currency can be spent only once.2 In that
* Partner at Ketsal PLLC. Adjunct Professor, University of Michigan Law School. For
thoughtful comments and conversations, I would like to thank Connie Chang, Joshua Garcia,
Zachary Fallon, Diego Zambrano, Pandora Chang, participants in the Arkansas Law Review
Symposium on the Evolving Regulation of Crypto, and the editors of the Arkansas Law Review. The views expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of
Ketsal.
1. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) typically uses the term “virtual currency” (or, somewhat less commonly, “digital currency”) to describe the subset of
digital assets to which it has laid jurisdictional claim, viewing “cryptocurrency” as “[o]ne
prominent type of virtual currency.” See, e.g., Retail Commodity Transactions Involving
Virtual Currency, 82 FED. REG. 60335 (proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (internal citations omitted). The Commission has defined “virtual currency” as “any
digital representation of value (a ‘digital asset’) that functions as a medium of exchange, and
any other digital unit of account that is used as a form of a currency (i.e., transferred from
one party to another as a medium of exchange); may be manifested through units, tokens, or
coins, among other things; and may be distributed by way of digital ‘smart contracts,’ among
other structures.” See Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Certain Digital Assets [
https://www.cftc.gov/media/3651/votingdraft032420/download] 9-11 (March 23, 2020).
Because this Article focuses on the CFTC and the treatment of virtual currencies under the
commodities laws, it adopts the Commission’s terminology (“virtual currencies”) to refer to
digital assets generally, other than cases where a meaningful distinction requires another
term. With respect to bitcoin specifically, this Article follows the convention of capitalizing
references to the Bitcoin protocol or network and referring to the unit of currency with the
lowercase “bitcoin.” See, e.g., Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN.ORG,
[https://perma.cc/Z6D2-AAHS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
2. The pseudonymous creator of Bitcoin, Satoshi Nakamoto, described the infamous
double-spending problem as follows:
The problem [with electronic payment systems] of course is the payee can’t verify
that one of the owners did not double-spend the coin. A common solution is to
introduce a trusted central authority, or mint, that checks every transaction for
double spending. . . . The problem with this solution is that the fate of the entire
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time, Bitcoin has inspired countless follow-on projects. Some
have attempted to improve the technology’s potential use for digital cash, by, for example, increasing the number of transactions
processed per second3 or improving user privacy.4 Others have
strayed further from Bitcoin’s original intent, building on blockchain—Bitcoin’s central innovation—to enable distributed computing and so-called smart contracting,5 decentralized lending,6
governance,7 data storage,8 and digital collectibles,9 among others.10 At the same time, regulators and scholars have struggled to
keep pace. A range of federal agencies has waded into the world
of virtual currencies, often beginning by characterizing the assets
as something recognizably within their authority (property,
money, a commodity, a security, and so on). And much of the
scholarly discourse has run along a parallel track, as scholars have
wrestled with the basic question of how legally to classify these

money system depends on the company running the mint, with every transaction
having to go through them, just like a bank. . . . [W]e propose a solution to the
double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed timestamp server to
generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions.
Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 2, 1 (2008),
[https://perma.cc/WMC9-6994].
3. See, e.g., BITCOIN CASH, [https://perma.cc/UT8T-M3Z4] (last visited Mar. 20,
2020) (“Bitcoin Cash brings sound money to the world, fulfilling the original promise of
Bitcoin as ‘Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash.’”)
4. See, e.g., KURT M. ALONSO, GETMONERO.ORG, ZERO TO MONERO: FIRST EDITION:
A TECHNICAL GUIDE TO A PRIVATE DIGITAL CURRENCY; FOR BEGINNERS, AMATEURS,
AND EXPERTS 1-2 (June 26, 2018, version 1.0.0), [https://perma.cc/YCB5-VNX6].
5. VITALIK BUTERIN, A NEXT-GENERATION SMART CONTRACT AND
DECENTRALIZED
APPLICATION
PLATFORM
1
(Ethereum
White
Paper),
[https://perma.cc/C7MT-JENS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
6. See, e.g., ROBERT LESHNER & GEOFFREY HAYES, COMPOUND: THE MONEY
MARKET PROTOCOL 1-3 (Feb. 2019, version 1.0), [https://perma.cc/HV2L-ZNQ5].
7. See CHRISTOPH JENTZSCH, DECENTRALIZED AUTONOMOUS ORGANIZATION TO
AUTOMATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Working Paper), [https://perma.cc/HW5D-WZH4] (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
8. See PROTOCOL LABS, FILECOIN: A DECENTRALIZED STORAGE NETWORK (July 19,
2017) (Working Paper), [https://perma.cc/WYC3-8R9S].
9. See CRYPTOKITTIES, CRYPTOKITTIES: COLLECTIBLE AND BREEDABLE CATS
EMPOWERED BY BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY, [https://perma.cc/GW38-K3WJ] (last visited
Mar. 20, 2020).
10. See Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67 DUKE L. J. 313,
325-26 (2017) (compiling additional potential use cases, including ridesharing, domain registration, crowdfunding, document ownership, prediction markets, voting, and wine provenance).
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new assets.11 In focusing, alongside government agencies, on
questions of classification, however, the scholarship has neglected an important aspect of the advent of virtual currencies: the
way in which a regulator’s efforts to fit an utterly novel asset into
a statutory definition so often not only define the asset but redefine the definition itself. The very uncertainty of a virtual currency’s classification—both legal and metaphysical—enables
regulators not only to claim jurisdiction over that asset but also to
reshape and broaden that jurisdiction. Enthusiasts and entrepreneurs have proposed numerous use cases for blockchain and virtual currencies. Federal regulators, without saying as much, have
put forward their own.
Because our basic understanding of the nature of virtual currencies is still developing, much of the regulatory and scholarly
conversation sensibly has focused on defining virtual currencies,
usually with reference to well understood legal categories. In the
last half-decade, both scholars and regulators have begun the task
of categorizing virtual currencies, aiming to situate them within
existing laws and regulations.12 Scholars, for their part, variously
have explored whether virtual currencies, legally speaking and
depending on context, are best considered property,13 money,14
commodities,15 stock,16 or securities.17 Others have analyzed specific blockchain applications vis-à-vis governments and the law,
asking whether smart contracts might replace legal contracts,18
11. See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Regulating Cryptocurrencies
in the United States: Current Issues and Future Directions, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 813,
814-15 (2014).
12. See, e.g., Katie Szilagyi, A Bundle of Blockchains? Digitally Disrupting Property
Law, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (2018); Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 11, at 814-15;
Mitchell Prentis, Digital Metal: Regulating Bitcoin as a Commodity, 66 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 609, 611-12 (2015); Thomas Lee Hazen, Tulips, Oranges, Worms, and Coins – Virtual,
Digital, or Crypto Currency and the Securities Laws, 20 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 493, 495-96
(2019); Carol R. Goforth, U.S. Law: Crypto Is Money, Property, a Commodity, and a Security, All at the Same Time, J. FIN. TRANSFORMATION (Forthcoming); Werbach & Cornell, supra note 10, at 319; PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE
LAW: THE RULE OF CODE (2018).
13. See, e.g., Szilagyi, supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., Middlebrook & Hughes, supra note 11.
15. See, e.g., Prentis, supra note 12, at 611-12.
16. See, e.g., David J. Shakow, The Tax Treatment of Tokens: What Does It Betoken?,
PENN LAW: FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP (Aug. 3, 2017), [https://perma.cc/8G47-92W2].
17. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12.
18. See, e.g., Werbach & Cornell, supra note 10, at 319.
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whether governments might use blockchain technology as a
means of regulation,19 and even whether the technology might
displace the law altogether in broad swaths of life.20 Generally
speaking, this dialogue centers on how people use or might use
blockchain technology, and what that use means for the law’s
treatment of blockchain. A technology’s legal classification frequently derives from its use,21 and commentators have noted that
regulatory scrutiny of blockchain technology has tracked the development of potential uses for the technology:22 Bitcoin’s use as
digital money, for example, attracted early interest from the
Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network23
and the Internal Revenue Service,24 and the later proliferation of
virtual currencies used as capital raising instruments invited the
attention of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).25 Federal agencies recognize elements of their traditional
subject matter in particular uses of blockchain technology. Because classification—as a commodity, as a security, and so on—
so often underlies jurisdiction, the question of classification is of
more than academic interest. To legally classify a virtual currency is to determine who has authority over it, and federal agencies, as a threshold matter, assert their jurisdiction via classification.

19. See, e.g., DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 8-9.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN2019-G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS MODELS
INVOLVING CONVERTIBLE VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 7 (2019) (a virtual currency’s “label . . .
is not dispositive of its regulatory treatment [and] . . . transactions denominated in [virtual
currency] will be subject to FinCEN regulations regardless of . . . the type of technology
utilized for the transmission of value.”). See also SEC, FRAMEWORK FOR “INVESTMENT
CONTRACT” ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ASSETS 1 n.6 (2019), [https://perma.cc/R7AJ-VWAG]
(noting that “under the Howey test, ‘form [is] disregarded for substance and the emphasis
[is] on economic reality.’”).
22. Jerry Brito et. al., Bitcoin Financial Regulation: Securities, Derivatives, Prediction
Markets, and Gambling, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 144, 152-55 (2014).
23. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, FIN-2013G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013).
24. See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 I.R.B. 938.
25. See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (July 25, 2017),
[https://perma.cc/6KA4-WS3W]; see also Report of Investigation: The DAO, Exchange Act
Release No. 81207, 117 SEC Docket 745 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO Report].
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The CFTC was among the earliest federal agencies to assert
authority over virtual currencies by classifying them, in its case,
as commodities, and ever since has acted as one of the keenest
virtual currency market police. The Commodity Exchange Act’s
(CEA) definition of “commodity”26 is notably broad, and as early
as 2014 the CFTC, noting that commodities underlie the agency’s
jurisdiction, had located virtual currencies within it.27 On this basis, the CFTC took action against a number of virtual currency
market participants, including an unregistered bitcoin option contract trading platform,28 a bitcoin derivatives trading platform that
engaged in wash trading and prearranged trades,29 an unregistered
leveraged bitcoin trading platform,30 and the perpetrator of a virtual currency Ponzi scheme.31 The CFTC also issued proposed
guidance on the difference between derivative and spot markets
in the virtual currency context,32 a question central to the scope of
its authority over virtual currency transactions,33 as well as a “primer” on risks of and the CFTC’s role in virtual currency markets34
and a “backgrounder” on the process for self-certifying bitcoin

26. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
27. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission: Effective Enforcement and the Future of Derivatives Regulation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Agric., Nutrition and Forestry,
113th Cong. 55 (2010) (testimony of Timothy Massad, Chairman, CFTC) [hereinafter Massad Testimony].
28. See In the Matter of: Coinflip, Inc., CFTC Docket No. 15-29, 2015 WL 5535736,
at *1 (Sept. 17, 2015) [hereinafter Coinflip].
29. In the Matter of: TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15–33, 2015 WL 5658082, at *1
(Sept. 24, 2015) [hereinafter TeraExchange].
30. In the Matter of: BFXNA INC. d/b/a BITFINEX, CFTC Docket No. 16-19, 2016
WL 3137612, at *1 (June 2, 2016) [hereinafter Bitfinex].
31. Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties Under the Commodity Exchange Fact and Commission Regulations at 1, Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., No. 17-7181, 2018 WL 6320656
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2018).
32. Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency, 82 Fed. Reg. 60,335
(proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1). The CFTC issued Final Interpretive Guidance concerning retail commodity transactions in virtual currency in March of
2020. See CFTC, RETAIL COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING CERTAIN DIGITAL
ASSETS (2020), [https://perma.cc/JSH7-XJDQ].
33. See infra Part III.
34. CFTC,
A
CFTC
PRIMER
ON
VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES
(2017),
[https://perma.cc/GTC4-JHGF]; see also Customer Advisory: Understand the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading, CFTC, [https://perma.cc/D6KX-8B8T] (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
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derivative products.35 Elemental to each of these assertions of jurisdiction was the claim, often explicit but not fully developed or
supported, that bitcoin and other virtual currencies are commodities under the CEA. Because the majority of these actions took
the form of either settlement orders or statements by the CFTC,
the agency did not have to provide support for its position. Only
when defendants resisted the classification of specific virtual currencies as commodities, forcing the CFTC to make its case in
court in CFTC v. McDonnell36 and CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay,
Inc.,37 did the CFTC have to defend and elaborate on its claim.
This Article approaches these virtual currency classificatory
debates from a different angle: focusing on the CFTC’s activity
in the virtual currency arena, it shows how the CFTC’s efforts to
fit virtual currencies within the CEA’s definition of “commodity”
serve not only to define virtual currencies (the focus of so much
industry, scholarly, and regulatory discussion) but also to redefine
the scope of the law, including new powers granted to the CFTC
in the wake of the Great Recession. The CFTC primarily regulates futures and other derivatives.38 It also has long had the authority to prosecute manipulation in the commodity spot markets.39 Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) lowered the evidentiary burden for commodity manipulation cases
and prohibited, in addition to manipulation, fraud in connection
with a “contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce.”40 The power Dodd-Frank arguably conferred on the
CFTC is extraordinary. Read to the extreme, the CFTC’s authority to prosecute fraud is limitless.41 To the extent that the CEA,
35. CFTC Backgrounder on Self-Certified Contracts for Bitcoin Products, CFTC,
[https://perma.cc/T9RK-H79D] (last visited Mar. 4, 2020).
36. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
37. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 494 (D. Mass. 2018).
38. See Retail Commodity Transactions Involving Virtual Currency, 82 Fed. Reg.
60,335, 60,336 (proposed Dec. 20, 2017) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 1).
39. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 217.
40. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2011).
41. That the fraud must be perpetrated in connection with interstate commerce is a
small limit in practice. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (internal citations omitted) (noting Congress may regulate intrastate economic activity
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as amended by Dodd-Frank, maintained any limits on this power,
the CFTC has taken advantage of virtual currency’s novelty and
murky regulatory status to blur those limits. In particular, the
CFTC has used virtual currency to assert an expansive vision of
the definition of a commodity (the basis for the CFTC’s jurisdiction in a given matter) and of its fraud power in the spot markets.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I explains how historically commodities regulation has primarily taken aim not at
commodities themselves but at futures and other derivatives contracts that reference those commodities, usually out of fear of the
ability of derivatives contracts to distort the spot markets for those
same commodities. In the United States, while federal commodities regulation has always focused on futures contracts and other
derivatives, the CFTC has also long enjoyed the authority to police manipulation in the underlying spot markets. In 2010, DoddFrank expanded the CFTC’s spot market powers to include new
anti-fraud authority and expanded anti-manipulation authority.
Part II traces how bitcoin, the earliest and most prominent virtual
currency, became a commodity under the CEA definition, and explains how that transformation elucidates the commodity definition itself. Utterly new commodities are relatively uncommon
any longer, and virtual currencies themselves present an increasingly rare opportunity to test the edges of the CEA’s commodity
definition.
Part III examines the CFTC’s efforts to expand its police
powers in the commodity spot markets on two fronts: via the commodity definition and by decoupling its anti-fraud from its antimanipulation authority. While the history and text of the CEA
demonstrate that a connection to the CFTC’s traditional purview—the futures markets—limits both the definition of a “commodity” and the CFTC’s authority to police fraud in the underlying spot markets, the CFTC has effectively harnessed virtual
currencies to push these areas of its authority to their limits. Virtual currency has played a prominent role in the CFTC’s push, on
the one hand, to bring literally every asset imaginable into the
substantially affecting interstate commerce, including intrastate coal mining, extortionate
credit transactions, restaurants using interstate supplies, hotels with interstate guests, and
production and consumption of homegrown wheat).
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commodity definition, and, on the other, to establish the CFTC’s
power to prosecute spot market fraud whether or not the fraud has
a manipulative effect on commodity spot or futures contract
prices. The regulatory and ontological uncertainty surrounding
virtual currencies make them particularly susceptible to, and useful for, this so-called regulatory creep.42
Finally, Part IV shows how the CFTC’s virtual currency successes have already begun to bear fruit in arenas beyond virtual
currency, and reflects on virtual currency’s seemingly unique susceptibility to and attractiveness for the expansion of regulatory
powers. The authority-expanding theories the CFTC explored in
the context of virtual currencies, and which the unique characteristics of virtual currencies helped establish, have already made
their way to other areas of the CFTC’s purview and likely will
continue to have ramifications both for virtual currencies specifically and the CFTC’s power generally. To be clear, this Article
does not make the claim that the CFTC acts inappropriately when
it advocates for broad readings of its powers. To the contrary,
like other government agencies, the CFTC faces enormous pressures to maximize its jurisdictional reach and has an obligation to
zealously pursue its mandate. Instead, this Article explores how
the CFTC has capitalized on virtual currencies to push, and how
virtual currencies help to delineate, the limits of the law.
I. FEDERAL COMMODITY REGULATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
The relationship between commodity derivative and spot
markets has often formed the basis of regulation, and has done so
in the United States in two ways: First, Congress has granted commodities regulators authority primarily in the derivatives markets,
typically due to the perceived influence of those markets over the
42. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives:
The Need for a Comparative Institution Report, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 122 (1995) (“One result
of the incentives that regulators have to expand their domain, protect themselves from blame,
and make their enforcement efforts easy is regulatory creep—the expansion of regulation
into areas where, from an efficiency perspective, it is not needed.”); Dan Awrey, Regulating
Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP., FIN. & COM.
L. 273, 295 (2011) (“The potential absence of sufficient certainty and predictability also
raises the prospect of ‘regulatory creep.’”).
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underlying spot markets; second, to the extent Congress has also
granted the CFTC spot market powers, including longstanding
anti-manipulation authority, it has done so to supplement the
CFTC’s regulatory oversight of the derivatives markets. Part I.A
briefly explains the difference between spot markets and futures
and other derivatives markets and the commonly understood influence of one on the other, and rehearses the more common justifications for the existence (and legal authorization) of derivatives markets, before providing a few historical examples of
regulation premised on the perceived interrelationship between
the two markets. Part I.B lays out a short history of the advent
and development of federal commodities regulation in the United
States, from the first federal commodities laws to the establishment of the CFTC, and culminating in Dodd-Frank’s expansion
of the CFTC’s spot market powers.
A.

The Interconnectedness of Spot and Futures Markets

The commodity markets, broadly speaking, take two forms:
spot (or cash) markets and derivatives markets. In spot markets,
market participants buy and sell physical commodities today, or
“on the spot.”43 In derivatives markets, by contrast, parties place
bets on a commodity’s future value or behavior.44 The contracts
setting forth the terms of these bets are known as derivative contracts because their value is “derivative” on that anticipated value
or behavior.45 Futures contracts, an early and common form of

43. Market, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The CFTC staff has defined
“spot transactions” as those in which “delivery of the product and immediate payment for
the products are expected on or within a few days of the trade date.” CFTC No-Action Letter,
CFTC LTR No. 98-73, 1998 WL 754623, *2 (Oct. 8, 1998). The Supreme Court has defined
“spot transactions” as “agreements for purchase and sale of commodities that anticipate nearterm delivery.” Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997).
44. Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2011).
45. See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1299 (2010) (“[D]erivatives are complex financial
contracts in which one party pays another party if ‘something’ happens in the future. . . .
‘[A]nything that can be quantified and objectively verified can be the subject of a derivative.’”) (internal citations omitted).
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derivative, are agreements to buy or sell a commodity at a future
point for a set price.46
Like other derivatives, futures contracts can be thought of as
wagers.47 Imagine oil is selling today for $50 a barrel. Imagine,
too, an airline company that knows it will require oil to fuel its
fleet in the coming year but believes the price of oil, and therefore
the cost of operating its business, is set to rise. Imagine, finally,
a speculator who disagrees with the airline’s prediction, believing
instead that the price of oil will fall in the coming year. The speculator might agree to sell the airline 100 barrels of oil one year
from today for $50 a barrel. The speculator is betting that the
price of oil will fall below $50 a barrel (if, in a year, a barrel of
oil sells for $40, the speculator will sell each barrel to the airline
for $10 more than the prevailing market price); the airline, on the
other hand, is betting the price of oil will rise above $50 a barrel
(if the price of oil ends up at $60 a barrel, the airline will buy its
100 barrels at a discount). When such contracts are standardized
and traded on exchanges, they are known as futures contracts.48
Of course, gambling is destructive—it redistributes existing value
rather than creating it, and the associated transaction costs mean
its value to society is net negative—and it increases the amount
of risk faced by all participants in a system.49 As with gambling,
many have warned of the dangers posed by speculative trading in
derivatives, including those who locate the origin of the 2008 financial crisis in such trading.50 If futures and other derivatives
trading poses such risks, why does the law permit it?
Economists and others who would justify the existence of
derivatives markets, and in particular futures markets, typically
46. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (“A ‘futures contract,’ or “future,’ never precisely defined by statute, nevertheless . . . . [I]s generally understood to be an executory, mutually binding agreement providing for the future delivery of a
commodity on a date certain where the grade, quantity, and price at the time of delivery are
fixed. To facilitate the development of a liquid market in these transactions, these contracts
are standardized and transferrable.”).
47. See Lynn A. Stout, How Deregulating Derivatives Led to Disaster, and Why ReRegulating Them Can Prevent Another, CORNELL LAW: FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP 5 (Jan. 1,
2009), [https://perma.cc/43A5-H6PJ] (“[Derivatives] are simple bets on the future—nothing
less, and nothing more.”).
48. Salomon Forex, 8 F.3d at 971.
49. Stout, supra note 44, at 13-14.
50. See, e.g., id.; Baker, supra note 45.

2020

NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN

215

highlight two services these markets purportedly provide: hedging and price discovery.51 Insurance, a familiar concept, helps
elucidate the first service—hedging—as well as derivatives generally. Insurance is itself a type of derivative.52 Fire insurance is
a homeowner’s bet that her house will burn down and the insurance company’s bet that it will not.53 The homeowner, exposed
to the risk that her home will burn down, offsets—hedges
against—that risk by entering into an insurance contract with the
insurance company.54 In this way, derivatives allow risk-averse
parties to shift risk to others better situated or more willing to bear
that risk, usually for a fee, just as the insurance company charges
the homeowner a premium for taking on the risk of her home
burning down.55
Commodities merchants have long used futures markets as
insurance against the often-unpredictable fluctuations in the price
of commodities.56 Producing, processing, distributing, or otherwise dealing in commodities exposes a business to the risk that
the price of a commodity the business requires will rise or that the
business wishes to sell will fall.57 To take a classic example, a
corn farmer might wish to sell his crop today at today’s prices,
despite the fact that he will not harvest it for many months.58 If,
due to forces beyond the farmer’s control or ken, corn prices have
crashed by harvest time, the farmer will sell his crop at a reasonable price and keep his farm. If, on the other hand, at harvest the
51. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 7, 10; Timothy E. Lynch, Coming Up Short: The
United States’ Second-Best Strategies for Corralling Purely Speculative Derivatives, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 545, 561 (2014) (“Derivatives markets are often praised for their ability
to provide price discovery.”). Indeed, the CEA itself justifies derivatives by referencing their
hedging and price discovery functions. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (stating that commodities derivatives transactions “provid[e] a means for managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information”).
52. Andrew Verstein, Insider Trading in Commodities Markets, 102 VA. L. REV. 447,
455 (2016) (“To the rancher, the futures exchange provides insurance or a hedge.”); Stout,
supra note 44, at 7.
53. Stout, supra note 44, at 7.
54. Id.
55. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Stout,
supra note 44, at 7, 14.
56. Verstein, supra note 52, at 453-55.
57. Wayne D. Greenstone, The CFTC and Government Reorganization: Preserving
Regulatory Independence, 33 BUS. LAW. 163, 173 (1977).
58. Baker, supra note 45, at 1299.
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price of corn has risen, the farmer will have sold his corn at a price
he can live with, and the money he will have left on the table is
the cost of not losing the farm. Hedgers can also hedge more indirectly—the farmer might, for example, hedge against the possibility of drought destroying the value of his crop via a weatherbased derivative.59 The same is true of the pencil maker exposed
to the fluctuating price of wood, the soda company that packages
its product in aluminum cans, the oil-burning airline in the example above, or any other number of companies whose product is or
incorporates a commodity.60 The derivatives markets are often
criticized for their use for economically destructive speculation,61
but the exposure of these companies to the commodities markets
means that not taking hedging positions in the derivatives markets
is itself an economically dangerous speculative act.62 The airline
that makes no bets in the oil futures markets is, in effect, betting
that the price of oil will fall, or go no higher. But what about the
gambling speculator without a company or other productive stake
in the commodities markets? To the extent pure speculators, as
opposed to hedgers, enter into the hedging justification, the law
permits their presence, in part, as providers of liquidity, acting as
the counterparties to the positions taken by businesses and others
seeking to hedge their risk.63 Without speculators, the argument
goes, the airline could not hedge its risk because there would be
no one to take the airline’s bet.
The second public good futures markets purportedly promote—price discovery—is “the process by which trading in a
market incorporates new information and market participants’ expectations into asset prices.”64 Price discovery does not uniquely
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Greenstone, supra note 57, at 174 (“By taking a position in the futures
market approximately equal and opposite from that taken in the cash market, the losses incurred in one market will be offset by gains in the other. The commercial firm is thus able to
establish a price for a commodity, or the commodity component of a product, and fix its raw
material costs. It no longer matters in which direction price moves, since any fluctuation has
been neutralized by the equal and opposite transaction.”).
61. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 8-10.
62. Greenstone, supra note 57, at 176.
63. Lynch, supra note 51, at 561, 567.
64. Christopher L. Culp, The Social Functions of Financial Derivatives, in FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: PRICING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 58 (Robert W. Kolb & James A. Overdahl
eds., 2010).
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occur in futures markets; all markets, including the spot markets
underlying commodity derivatives markets, incorporate supply
and demand information to determine the appropriate price for a
given asset.65 But many argue that futures markets, due to their
higher volume and greater liquidity, assimilate more, better information faster and more accurately than physical commodity markets.66 An example helps show why this might be the case. Trade
in, say, oil is encumbered by shipping and storage costs—by the
physicality of the commodity. If you want to own oil, you’ll
likely need to own barrels and tankers; to employ people to pilot
and look after the tankers; you’ll need to pay for a place to park
your oil.67 Because trade in oil futures is not similarly restrained
and includes not only market participants who need oil but also
speculators who don’t, the thinking goes, oil futures trade faster
and more frequently and are therefore better able to incorporate
information affecting the price of oil. Moreover, because the futures markets take in, digest, analyze, and summarize all information presently available about a specific commodity to produce
the anticipated (i.e., future) spot price of that commodity on a particular date in the future, futures markets discover and disseminate price information regarding not only futures prices but also
the appropriate spot price.68 In other words, in gathering the collective wisdom of the markets to foretell future prices, the futures
markets also necessarily reveal the market’s present view of a
commodity’s value today.69
The futures and spot markets are inextricable, and for this
reason governments have often regulated one with a view to its
65. Lynch, supra note 51, at 562-63.
66. See id. at 564; Stout, supra note 44, at 10, 30-31; Greenstone, supra note 57, at
172.
67. The recent unprecedented fall below zero of certain oil futures contracts caused by
the COVID-19 pandemic underscores both the interrelation between futures and spot prices
and the cost of having no place to put your oil when delivery comes due. See Catherine Ngai,
et al., Oil Plunges Below Zero for First Time in Unprecedented Wipeout, BLOOMBERG,
(April 19, 2020), [https://perma.cc/T7DL-YKGM].
68. Lynch, supra note 51, at 562-63; Greenstone, supra note 60.
69. Lynch, supra note 51, at 563; Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165. Detractors have
suggested reasons for doubting both the hedging liquidity and price discovery justifications
for derivatives markets, in particular in the case of speculative use of these markets and in
over-the-counter markets. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 44, at 30-31; Lynch, supra note 51, at
564-66.
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effects on the other. Logically, the price of a commodity today
tells you something about its likely price in the future, and vice
versa. Businesses use futures markets not only to hedge their exposure to commodity price movements but also as a guide for a
multitude of business decisions. The prices discovered by the futures markets provide businesses with a benchmark at which to
buy, sell, and transfer commodities today.70 They also allow businesses to plan how they will allocate their resources, “mak[ing]
more informed consumption, production, investment, financing,
contracting, and marketing decisions.”71 Futures prices act as
“one of the major guideposts for the economy in allocating resources,”72 leading many to view the futures markets as a “public
good.”73 These benefits only exist because of the strong connection between the futures and spot markets.74
Not everyone holds so rosy a view of the futures markets,
however, and as long as organized futures markets have existed,
farmers, merchants, and governments have blamed them for distortions in the cash markets. Just as the theoretical benefits of the
futures markets depend on the interrelationship between the futures and spot markets, futures market detractors focus on the
ability of the futures markets to affect spot market prices, either
viewing the futures markets as inherently distortionary or as ripe
targets for manipulators looking to affect one market by manipulating another.75 As a result, for as long as organized futures markets have existed, governments have attempted to rein in, or even
harness, the distortions thought to emanate from them. In eighteenth century Japan, for example, the Tokugawa shogunate authorized the first government-sanctioned futures exchange, the
70. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165-66.
71. Lynch, supra note 51, at 564.
72. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 173.
73. Lynch, supra note 51, at 564. See also Verstein, supra note 52 (“Price discovery
and price signals are essential to a market society.”).
74. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 165. The connection also enables common types of
commodities manipulation. See Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation
Law: The New CFTC Rules and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15
U. PA. J. BUS. L. 357, 366 (2013).
75. See, e.g., Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 971 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Since
the prices of futures are contingent on the vagaries of both the production of the commodity
and the economics of the marketplace, they are particularly susceptible to manipulation and
excessive speculation.”).
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Dojima Rice Exchange, because it believed that trading in rice
futures would artificially inflate the value of the underlying rice.76
In the late nineteenth century in the United States, fears about the
effect of futures markets on commodity prices led to repeated attempts to outlaw futures trading altogether.77 Virtual currency
markets provide their own fascinating example: The CFTC reportedly used bitcoin futures to pop 2017’s astonishing virtual
currency spot market bubble.78 According to then-CFTC Chairman J. Christopher Giancarlo, the CFTC approved bitcoin futures
as a way of introducing skepticism into an exuberant bitcoin spot
market, whose prices were at their all-time high.79 Per Giancarlo,
the plan worked, and the bitcoin bubble burst.80

76. Mark D. West, Private Ordering at the World’s First Futures Exchange, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 2574, 2582-83 (2000). The shogunate hoped higher rice prices would curry favor
with the military, who were paid in the commodity, and influential feudal lords, who used
rice to repay certain loans. Id. Derivatives contracts long predated sanctioned derivatives
exchanges, having existed since at least the time of Babylonia, where merchants made loans
to traders contingent on the successful arrival of the caravan carrying their goods, charging
a higher-than-usual interest rate to compensate for the risk that the caravan or goods were
lost to the desert, marauders, or other dangers. LAURENT L. JACQUE, GLOBAL DERIVATIVES
DEBACLES: FROM THEORY TO MALPRACTICE 4 (2010). The underlying spot markets are
older still—indeed, the oldest in the world. Verstein, supra note 52, at 453.
77. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 178. See also Stout, supra note 44, at 11-14 (Eighteenth and nineteenth century American common law declined to enforce speculative derivative contracts, including because speculators in the derivatives markets might be tempted
to manipulate the spot markets and because speculative derivates posed systemic risk to the
commodity markets).
78. Brady Dale, Trump Administration Popped 2017 Bitcoin Bubble, Ex-CFTC Chair
Says, COINDESK (Oct. 22, 2019) [https://perma.cc/F9MQ-D446].
79. Id.
80. Id. Giancarlo’s story offers another example of a theoretical justification for the
role of speculators in derivatives markets. Giancarlo’s argument runs as follows: The bitcoin
spot markets largely required participants to own bitcoin. Id.; see also Stout, supra note 44,
at 7 (“Speculating in the . . . [commodity] “spot” markets . . . requires a speculator to actually
buy and hold” the commodity.). Owning bitcoin, in turn, required a familiarity with the
technology that Bitcoin adherents were more likely to possess, leading the spot market price
to reveal not the market’s view of bitcoin’s value but instead Bitcoin evangelists’ view of
the value of bitcoin—which was exaggerated. Only when bitcoin derivatives allowed for
Bitcoin skeptics to express their views (by betting against or “shorting” bitcoin) without
having to own bitcoin or learn anything about the technology did the bubble built by the
Bitcoin believers burst. Dale, supra note 77.
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A Brief History of Futures Regulation in the United
States

Federal commodities laws in the United States have traditionally taken aim at futures rather than spot markets, in particular
manipulation of the futures markets and its potential to affect the
underlying spot markets. In the early twentieth century, farmers
and commodity dealers suspected that futures market speculation
and manipulation were to blame for waning commodity prices
and other market ills.81 In response, Congress produced the Future Trading Act of 1921—promptly struck down as an improper
use of the taxing power82—and then the Grain Futures Act of
1922.83 As their names suggest, these early laws focused not on
spot market transactions but on trading in futures and other derivatives. The Grain Futures Act was not given its current, somewhat
misleading title—the Commodity Exchange Act—until 1936.84
Congress did not create the CFTC until many years later but,
as with the earliest iterations of the federal commodities law, trouble in the spot markets led to the creation of an agency whose
primary mission is the regulation of the U.S. derivatives markets.
The CFTC owes its existence to anchovies—or, rather, a lack of
anchovies.85 The Peruvian anchoveta has a claim to being, in economic terms, the most important fish in the sea.86 No wild fish is
harvested in greater quantities,87 and the fish is one of the world

81. Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993); Stout, supra note
44, at 17; John H. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short and NotSo-Reverent History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 825, 829 (1982).
82. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44, 66-69 (1922).
83. In his opinion striking down the Future Trading Act, Chief Justice Taft suggested
that the act might have passed constitutional muster had Congress had the “commerce clause
in mind” rather than the taxing power. Id. at 68-69. Taking this cue, Congress tried again in
the Grain Futures Act, this time successfully relying on the commerce clause. Stassen, supra
note 81, at 830; Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1923).
84. Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1491. See also Stassen, supra note 81,
at 832.
85. Stassen, supra note 81, at 833.
86. Cf. H. BRUCE FRANKLIN, THE MOST IMPORTANT FISH IN THE SEA: MENHADEN
AND AMERICA 205-217 (2007) (making the case for bunker or the menhaden).
87. T. Iwamoto et al., ENGRAULIS RINGENS. THE IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES (2010), [https://perma.cc/Z6J4-5SCH].
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economy’s primary sources of feed for livestock.88 When, in
1972, the anchoveta schools failed to turn up off the coast of Peru,
ranchers and merchants had to draw on other sources to feed the
world’s livestock.89 The anchovies had bad timing. They joined,
in the words of the chairman of one of the oldest and most important futures exchanges in the world, an “extraordinary coincidence of global events which suddenly wiped out the last of dwindling grain surpluses and plunged the world into severe shortages
of food.”90 Food prices soared, inviting congressional scrutiny.91
Although the specter of futures market speculation and manipulation drove much of the congressional agenda, Congress did not
ultimately find that the futures markets were to blame.92 Nonetheless, the hubbub ended in the creation of the CFTC, providing
one more example of the tendency of problems in the spot markets to result in greater regulation of the derivatives markets.93
In the years that followed, the federal commodities laws underwent several additional series of significant revisions to expand or limit the CFTC’s jurisdiction over derivatives trading94
before arriving at the current compilation of the federal commodities laws, an amended Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).95 The
CEA, like its predecessors and in spite of its name, concerns itself
with regulation of the derivatives markets and has very little to
say about commodities qua commodities.96 To the extent that the
CEA confers power over the commodities referenced by futures
and derivatives contracts, it does so in service of the Act’s regulation of the derivatives markets.97 The link between spot market
88. Greenstone, supra note 60, at 180; Small Business Problems Involved in the Marketing of Grain and Other Commodities: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Spec. Small Bus.
Problems of the Permanent Select Comm. on Small Bus., 93rd Cong. 135 (1973) (testimony
of Frederick G. Uhlmann, Chairman of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago) [hereinafter Hearings].
89. CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE RECORDS PT. 1, THE SOYBEAN PHENOMENON 5-8
(1974).
90. Hearings, supra note 88, at 135.
91. Greenstone, supra note 57, at 177.
92. Id. at 177-79, 181.
93. See id. at 181, 185-86.
94. Stout, supra note 44, at 17-18.
95. See id.
96. Stassen, supra note 81, at 832.
97. The CEA’s “purpose” is to “serve the public interest[]” of “providing a means for
managing and assuming price risks, discovering prices, or disseminating pricing information
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prices and futures prices means that manipulation in the spot market can lead to outsized gains in the futures markets.98 From the
manipulator’s perspective, who controls a commodity in the present controls the commodity’s future, transforming the business
of betting on the future from a gamble into a sure thing.99 Antimanipulation power in the spot markets has thus long been understood to be a supplement necessary to the effective regulation of
the futures markets.100
Although the CFTC has had anti-manipulation power in the
spot markets since its creation,101 for many years the CFTC had
little success prosecuting spot market manipulation cases. It’s
one thing for a statute to grant a power in the abstract. It’s another
thing entirely to successfully exercise that power in concrete
cases. Manipulative activity is often indistinguishable from legitimate market behavior102—the defining difference is a showing of
through trading in liquid, fair and financially secure [derivatives] trading facilities.” Commodities Exchange Act (CEA), 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). The deterrence and prevention of fraud
and price manipulation, which disrupt market integrity, serve to further this purpose. 7
U.S.C. § 5(b). See also Prime Int’l Trading v. BP P.L.C., 937 F.3d 94, 107 (2d Cir. 2019)
(citing CEA’s enumerated purpose); Greenstone, supra note 57, at 177 (internal citations
omitted) (“The primary role of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in this process
is to protect the economic utility of the futures markets by ensuring the integrity of futures
prices by making certain that price actually does reflect anticipated supply and demand.”);
Salomon Forex, Inc. v. Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 970 (4th Cir. 1993) (“Because the [CEA] was
aimed at manipulation, speculation, and other abuses that could arise from the trading in
futures contracts and options, as distinguished from the commodity itself, Congress never
purported to regulate ‘spot’ transactions (transactions for the immediate sale and delivery of
a commodity).”). See also CFTC v. Erskine, 512 F.3d 309, 321 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Salomon).
98. See Stout, supra note 44, at 28 (“[D]erivatives markets . . . [allow for bets] that are
an order of magnitude larger than the spot market itself [including, for example,] . . . $10
trillion in derivative contracts on a $1 trillion market for mortgage bonds, just as a bookie
can take in $100,000 in bets on a horserace with a $10,000 winner’s purse.”). For manipulative strategies available to exploit this aspect of relationship between the spot and futures
markets, see Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 366-69.
99. See Stout, supra note 44, at 137.
100. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2010) (making it unlawful for “[a]ny person to manipulate
or attempt to manipulate the price of any commodity in interstate commerce”); 7 U.S.C. § 5.
In the virtual currency context, see CFTC Backgrounder on Oversight of and Approach to
Virtual Currency Futures Markets, CFTC, 4 (Jan. 4, 2018), [https://perma.cc/9XNA-GHHC]
(justifying heightened review of virtual currency derivatives in part by reference to enhanced
ability to police underlying virtual currency spot markets for fraud and manipulation).
101. See 7 U.S.C. § 13.
102. See, e.g., Robert C. Lower, Disruptions of the Futures Market: A Comment on
Dealing with Market Manipulation, 8 YALE J. REG. 391, 392 (1991) (“[D]rawing a line between healthy economic behavior” and manipulation is difficult and imprecise.).
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illicit intent103—and manipulation cases have proven difficult to
prosecute. In fact, in the first 35 years of its existence, the CFTC
only prevailed in a single litigated manipulation case.104 When
the 2008 financial crisis brought commodity derivatives regulation under congressional scrutiny, the CFTC itself emphasized
these lackluster results as part of a plea for broader anti-manipulation powers.105
Congress granted the CFTC’s request for enhanced spot
market anti-manipulation authority in the Dodd-Frank Act.106
Dodd-Frank section 753 amended CEA section 6(c) by importing
the language of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (Exchange Act).107 Among other things, this language lowered the bar for establishing manipulation liability, which now requires mere reckless activity rather than specific intent.108 No
longer would the CFTC have to prove that a defendant specifically intended its activity to cause artificial prices. The language
comes with baggage, however: decades of case law developed in
the securities law context.109 In addition to enhanced anti-manipulation authority, this case law smuggled in something else along
with it: anti-fraud authority,110 the bounds of which had yet (and
have yet) to be determined in the commodities context. Once
again, perceived trouble in the derivatives markets had spurred a
legislative response, this time setting the stage for the CFTC to
play an expansive role in the spot markets.

103. Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 375-76. Courts employ a four-part test to
find manipulation in violation of the CEA: (1) ability to influence price; (2) intent; (3) causation; and (4) artificial price. See id. at 392. Many common market activities meet every
element but the second, and thus, the activities are lawful. Id. at 385-88.
104. CFTC, USDA Farm Credit Nominations Hearing: Hearing Before the Comm. on
Agric., Nutrition and Forestry, 111th Cong. 13 (2009), (statement of Bart Chilton, Comm’r,
CFTC). In this period the CFTC did, however, settle many manipulation claims. Id. at 52
(testimony of Bart Chilton, Comm’r, CFTC).
105. See id. at 50-54.
106. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 742, 124 Stat. 1376, 1732-34 (2010).
107. See Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,39899 (July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
108. See Abrantes-Metz et. al., supra note 74, at 393-94.
109. See id. at 394.
110. See id.
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II. BITCOIN BILDUNGSROMAN: HOW BITCOIN
BECAME A COMMODITY
Over the years, in addition to expanding and contracting the
CFTC’s jurisdiction, primarily in the derivatives markets but recently in the spot markets, Congress repeatedly amended the federal commodities laws to enlarge the definition of “commodity.”
Today’s definition is extremely broad—broad enough to give the
CFTC clear jurisdiction over bitcoin.111 Nonetheless, the statutory definition has always been, and continues to be, narrower
than the use of the term in common parlance.112 The advent of
Bitcoin helps to show that assets can become, and perhaps cease
to be, statutory commodities. An SEC official’s 2018 statement
suggesting that “a digital asset offered as a security can [potentially], over time, become something other than a security,”113
launched a thousand commentators’ pens in the crypto-industry
and academia.114 By contrast, the CEA’s expansive definition of
“commodity,” combined with the greater perceived potential for
securities regulation to hamper virtual currency innovation,115 has
meant that scarcely any attention has been paid to the way in
which a virtual currency can become a commodity. Instead, the
discourse has treated a virtual currency’s commodity status as
111. Cf. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
112. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9), with Commodity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
[https://perma.cc/4UQE-EDWF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2020) (defining “commodity” broadly
to include “an economic good” or “something useful or valued”).
113. William Hinman, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, Remarks at the Yahoo Finance All Markets Summit: Crypto, Digital
Asset Transactions: When Howey Met Gary (Plastic)
(June 14, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/E24X-YZX4].
114. See, e.g., Jerry Brito, SEC Chairman Clayton Just Confirmed Commission Staff
Analysis That Found Ethereum (and Cryptos Like It) Are Not Securities, COIN CENTER (Mar.
12, 2019), [https://perma.cc/4KSJ-UC2B] (noting frequent inquiries regarding a digital asset’s ability to evolve beyond security status and correspondence between congressman and
SEC chairman regarding same); AM. BAR ASS’N, DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS:
FEDERAL AND STATE JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES (Mar. 2019) [hereinafter DIGITAL AND
DIGITIZED ASSETS]; Hazen, supra note 12, at 510; Andrew Verstein, Crypto Assets and Insider Trading Law’s Domain, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2019); James J. Park, When Are
Tokens Securities? Some Questions from the Perplexed, LOWELL MILKEN INST. POL’Y REP.
UCLA L. & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 18-13 (2018).
115. See, e.g., Joseph A. Hall, Howey, Ralston Purina and the SEC’s Digital Asset
Framework, 52 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 137, 141 (2019) (“[L]abeling a digital asset
a security for purposes of the federal securities laws is . . . effectively a death knell for the
asset”).
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fixed, with scholars, litigants, courts, and the CFTC arguing either
that a given virtual currency is or is not a commodity.116 What the
discussion has missed, and what bitcoin’s atypicality helps us
conceive, is that a given asset can enter, and potentially leave, the
CEA’s commodity definition. Indeed, bitcoin did: Bitcoin was
not always a commodity. It had to become one.
This Part follows bitcoin’s path to becoming a commodity
and uses bitcoin’s evolutionary journey to probe the CEA’s definition of “commodity.” Part II.A recounts how the CFTC first
asserted and then established its jurisdiction over bitcoin and
other virtual currencies. Consistent with its central jurisdictional
grant, early CFTC actions focused on bitcoin derivatives, rather
than bitcoin itself, but these actions were necessarily predicated
on the claim, at times stated at others tacit, that bitcoin is a commodity. At the same time, the CFTC conflated bitcoin and other
virtual currencies, setting the stage to extend (as explored in Part
III below) its jurisdictional claim to other virtual currencies and
the virtual currency spot markets as a whole. Part II.B examines
the CEA’s commodity definition through the lens of virtual currencies and shows how virtual currencies’ novelty helpfully exposes interpretive difficulties lurking in the definition. Part II.C
takes on the most salient of these interpretive issues, identifies a
problematic but common reading of the definition caused, in part,
by the seemingly inelegant drafting of the statute, and endorses a
different reading that resolves the definition’s potential ambiguity
and redeems its wording.
A.

Gaining Purchase: The CFTC’s First Virtual Currency
Foothold

The CFTC has claimed jurisdiction over bitcoin and other
virtual currencies since at least 2014.117 CFTC authority depends,
in every case, on the existence of a commodity, whether that commodity underlies a derivative contract (in the derivatives markets)
116. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12, at 502 n.35 (“[C]rypto currencies clearly fall
within the definition of commodity”); Verstein, supra note 114, at 20 (any given virtual currency “highly likely” to be a commodity); Prentis, supra note 12, at 626 (arguing for bitcoin’s
classification as a commodity based on its use); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 217 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
117. Massad Testimony, supra note 27.
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or is the subject of fraud and manipulation (in the spot markets).118
The CFTC began establishing this threshold with respect to virtual currencies in 2014, when it first pointed to bitcoin as a specific example of a virtual currency and asserted that virtual currencies meet the definition of “commodity” set forth in §1a(9) of
the CEA.119 In a series of uncontested administrative proceedings
that followed, the CFTC shored up its claim to bitcoin markets,
filing and settling actions in connection with the operation of an
unregistered bitcoin option contracts trading facility,120 wash trading,121 and facilitating off-exchange leveraged commodity transactions,122 all in violation of the CEA and CFTC regulations.
These proceedings laid the groundwork for a more expansive
assertion of oversight authority by the CFTC: first, by solidifying
bitcoin’s status as a commodity (and thereby the CFTC’s authority in the bitcoin spot as well as derivatives markets) and, second,
by consistently equating bitcoin and “other virtual currencies.”123
To be sure, each action predominantly involved bitcoin derivatives, as opposed to other virtual currencies or spot market trading
(in bitcoin or otherwise). But the CFTC has authority over bitcoin
derivatives only if bitcoin is a commodity. And while bitcoin’s

118. See, e.g., PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION 7 (2004) (“Since federal regulation of derivatives pivots on whether a commodity is involved, it is necessary first to define the term.”); see also Salomon Forex, Inc. v.
Tauber, 8 F.3d 966, 972 (4th Cir. 1993) (“[T]he CEA uses the term ‘commodity’ in setting
the jurisdiction of the CFTC”). But see Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Hunter
Wise Commodities, LLC, 749 F.3d 967, 974 (11th Cir. 2014) (distinguishing between
CFTC’s “statutory authority, its ‘jurisdiction,’” and the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts).
119. Massad Testimony, supra note 27. At this point, the legal literature has given
ample and able treatment to Bitcoin’s background and underlying technology. For a layperson’s introduction to the technology and a bird’s eye view of the legal landscape, see
PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE RULE OF
CODE (2018).
120. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *1.
121. TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *1.
122. Bitfinex, supra note 30, at *1.
123. See, e.g., Massad Testimony, supra note 27 (“While the CFTC does not have policies and procedures specific to virtual currencies like bitcoin, the agency’s authority extends
to futures and swaps contracts in any commodity.”); Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (“Bitcoin
and other virtual currencies are . . . properly defined as commodities.”); Bitfinex, supra note
30, at *5.
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commodity status is now indisputable,124 for the first years of its
existence it almost as clearly was not a commodity, as we will
see. This did not prevent the CFTC, in the days before bitcoin’s
status had transformed, from making premature claims to the virtual currency. Nor has it prevented the CFTC, now that bitcoin’s
status as a commodity has solidified, from using this firm ground
as a steppingstone to reach other virtual currencies and to probe
the outer bounds of its oversight authority in the commodity spot
markets. In a striking example of regulatory creep, elaborated on
in Part III below, virtual currencies have become both the test case
for the extent of this authority and a tool the CFTC uses to carve
out a wider expanse of territory than Congress likely intended
with the passage of §753 of Dodd-Frank.
The precedents established by regulator statements and settlement orders, though not carrying the force of a court decision,
acclimate lawyers, courts, and market participants to the idea that
first bitcoin and then all other virtual currencies are commodities,
moving the baseline of the argument, and contribute to the slow
creep of a regulator’s expanding jurisdiction. They are also more
easily produced and controlled than a court case. Indeed, one benefit of settling rather than litigating early cases, from a regulator’s
perspective, is the opportunity to make unsupported statements
about the law, without opposition from the settling parties, that by
the dint of time come to be the accepted view.125 The CFTC’s
early settlement orders offer next to no analysis in support of the
claim that bitcoin qualifies as a “commodity” under CEA §1a(9),
much less other virtual currencies, instead asserting, in near-conclusory fashion, that “[t]he definition of a ‘commodity’ is
broad.”126 Such precedent, tenuous as it may be, sets the baseline

124. David E. Aron and Matthew Jones, The CFTC’s Characterization of Virtual Currencies as Commodities: Implications under the Commodity Exchange Act and CFTC Regulations, 38 No. 5 FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 1 (May 2018).
125. See, e.g., DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS, supra note 114, at 72 (speculating that
CFTC took unusual step of not imposing monetary penalty in Coinflip because case was
aimed at “providing notice to the market of [CFTC’s] assertion of enforcement authority
over virtual currencies.”).
126. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (internal citations omitted); Bitfinex, supra note 30,
at 5; TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *3 n.3 (respondent consented to the application of the
CEA); Complaint at ¶ 12, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc.,
No. 17-7181 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2017).
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of the argument in the CFTC’s favor, begins immediately to affect
the behavior of market participants, and accustoms entrepreneurs
and attorneys alike to the possibility that bitcoin and all other virtual currencies are at risk of regulation by the CFTC.
B.

Statutory Commodities: A Rose Is a Rose Is a Rose in
which Contracts for Future Delivery Are Presently or in
the Future Dealt in

CEA §1a(9)’s definition of a commodity is worth quoting in
full—and merits more attention than one might typically give to
block quotations of statutory text127—not the least for its Linnaean
attempt to inventory the things of the world:
The term “commodity” means wheat, cotton, rice, corn, oats,
barley, rye, flaxseed, grain sorghums, mill feeds, butter,
eggs, Solanum tuberosum (Irish potatoes), wool, wool tops,
fats and oils (including lard, tallow, cottonseed oil, peanut
oil, soybean oil, and all other fats and oils), cottonseed meal,
cottonseed, peanuts, soybeans, soybean meal, livestock, livestock products, and frozen concentrated orange juice, and all
other goods and articles, except onions (as provided by section 13-1 of this title) and motion picture box office receipts
(or any index, measure, value, or data related to such receipts), and all services, rights, and interests (except motion
picture box office receipts, or any index, measure, value or
data related to such receipts) in which contracts for future
delivery are presently or in the future dealt in.128

The definition of a “commodity” is broad indeed.129 Its strange
and inconsistent specificity—Why enumerate varieties of fats and
oils but not varieties of livestock? Is butter not a “livestock product”? Why except onions?130—calls out for political and
127. See, e.g., MARK HERRMANN, THE CURMUDGEON’S GUIDE TO PRACTICING LAW
7-8 (2006).
128. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9) (2010).
129. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. It is also, however, narrower than the
dictionary definition of commodity. Strange, then, that courts and commentators reach for
the dictionary. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp.
3d 213, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018); Prentis, supra note 12, at 626.
130. In the 1950s, Vince Kosuga, an onion farmer and commodities trader, cornered
the onion market. Owning, effectively, all the onions in the United States, Kosuga got rich
overcharging for the onions he could sell. Then he shorted the market before flooding it with
his oversupply, profiting from his short positions as the onion market crashed. Keith Romer,
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historical context, without which the definition seems arbitrary,
even nonsensical.
The short explanation for the patchwork state of the definition is that it was sewn together over many years. The federal
commodities laws began with a slender definition of the underlying commodities to be regulated. The laws’ first constitutional
iteration, the Grain Futures Act of 1922, limited federal jurisdiction to corn, wheat, oats, barley, rye, flax, and sorghum.131 For
the next fifty years, Congress engaged in the hopeless, endless
task of cataloguing132 the world’s commodities, adding to the list
whenever futures trading developed in a good it wished to regulate.133 This ad hoc approach proved too tedious even for Congress, and in 1974, legislators took a new tack. Under the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Congress
created the CFTC and vested it with the authority to regulate futures markets overlying not only the already-enumerated commodities but also commodities falling into two broad catchalls:
(1) “all other goods and articles” and (2) “all services, rights, and
interests” for “which contracts for future delivery are presently or
in the future dealt in.” 134 The definition has been amended since,
but not since 2010135 and, it will be noted, not to name “virtual
currency,” “cryptocurrency,” “digital assets,” or any of the other
various nomenclatures that might encompass bitcoin or the virtual
The Great Onion Corner and the Futures Market, NPR (Oct. 22, 2015)
[https://perma.cc/SPR8-JNBW]. Today, the CEA bans trading in onions futures and the spot
price for onions is, as a result, extremely volatile. Mike Bird, The World Cries Out for Onion
Derivatives, WALL ST. J. (June 13, 2019), [https://perma.cc/J5P8-SX4M]; Felix Salmon,
Trading in Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2010), [https://perma.cc/P6QR-X9JL].
131. Grain Futures Act of 1922, 42 Stat. 998.
132. See HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK; OR THE WHALE (2008) (ebook),
[https://perma.cc/85CD-S8H9] (“It would be a hopeless, endless task to catalogue all these
things. Let a handful suffice.”).
133. See Commodity Exchange Act of 1936, 49 Stat. 1491 (adding cotton, rice, mill
feeds, butter, eggs and Irish potatoes); Commodity Exchange Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 205 (adding wool tops); Commodity Exchange Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1059 (adding fats and oils, cottonseed, cotton seed meal, peanuts, soybeans, and soybean meal); National Wool Act of
1954, Pub. L. No. 83-690, 68 Stat. 910, 913 (adding wool); Commodity Exchange Act of
1955, Pub. L. 84-174, 69 Stat. 375 (adding onions, later excised by the Onion Futures Act,
Pub. L. 85-839, 72. Stat. 1013); Commodity Exchange Act of 1968, Pub. L. 90-258, 82 Stat.
26 (adding soybean meal, livestock, and livestock products).
134. JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra at note 118, at 8-9 (reading futures requirement to apply throughout).
135. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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currency projects the followed it.136 It’s left to the catchalls, therefore, to capture virtual currencies.
Any attempt to apply the statute to a given virtual currency
raises five interpretive questions:
First, which of the catchalls catches virtual currencies? That
is, is a virtual currency (1) a good or article or (2) a service, right,
or interest? The CFTC has at different times taken different positions on this issue,137 and its resolution matters for the second
interpretive question.
Namely, second, does what I will call the “futures requirement” apply to both catchalls, or only to “all services, rights, and
interests”? If the commodity definition requires futures trading
only in services, rights, or interests, and not in goods or articles,
then a determination that virtual currencies are goods would
lower the first hurdle to CFTC jurisdiction. Any “good,” regardless of the existence of future contracts in it, would be a commodity.138
Third, to the extent the futures requirement applies to whichever catchall catches virtual currencies, what sort of futures
count? Do unregulated international futures suffice, or must regulated domestic futures exist?139
136. See, e.g., Heath Tarbert et al., Leaders of CFTC, FinCEN, and SEC Issue Joint
Statement on Activities Involving Digital Assets, SEC Public Statement, n.4 (Oct. 11, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/Y8BT-Q3ST] (“Digital assets may be referred to in the industry by labels
such as ‘virtual assets,’ ‘crypto-assets,’ ‘digital tokens,’ ‘digital coins,’ ‘digital currencies,’
‘cryptocurrencies,’ and ‘convertible virtual currencies.’ Financial activities involving digital
assets may also be referred to as ‘initial coin offerings’ or ‘ICOs.’”).
137. Compare, e.g., Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (suggesting that bitcoin is captured
by “all services, rights, and interests”) with Brief of CFTC in Support of Preliminary Injunction and Other Relief, at *11, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.
Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y.), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366
(E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-361) [hereinafter CFTC McDonnell Brief] (CFTC arguing that
bitcoin and litecoin (a bitcoin clone) fall into both “rights and interests” and “all other goods
and articles”) and Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant Crater and Relief Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss the Amended Complaint at 7, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big
Coin Pay, Inc., No. 18-CV-10077-RWZ, at 7 (D. Mass. 2018) [hereinafter CFTC MBC
Brief] (CFTC arguing that virtual currencies are “goods”).
138. Compare CFTC MBC Brief, supra note 135, at 8 (“[T]he modifier . . . ‘presently
or in the future dealt in,’ applies as a matter of syntax, punctuation, and grammar, only to
‘services, rights, and interests.’”) with DIGITAL AND DIGITIZED ASSETS, supra note 114, at
79 (suggesting “that Congress did not intend to give the CFTC authority over commodities
that would have no connection to a futures market”).
139. Compare, e.g., Thomas A. Russo & Edwin L. Lyon, The Exclusive Jurisdiction
of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 6 HOFSTRA L. Rᴇᴠ. 57, 58 n.3 (1977) (“It
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Fourth, to the extent the futures requirement applies, at what
point must the futures exist? Must futures trading exist today?
With reasonable likelihood in the near future? It is enough that
the futures be merely conceivable?140
Finally, to the extent the futures requirement applies, do
bitcoin futures satisfy the requirement for all virtual currencies?
Or only for bitcoin, leaving other virtual currencies outside of the
definition—and the CFTC’s jurisdiction—until virtual currencyspecific futures develop or, at a minimum, until they are shown to
be sufficiently similar to bitcoin to justify finding bitcoin futures
to satisfy the futures requirement in their case?
The novelty of virtual currencies—rare anymore in the commodity world—helps expose these definitional fault lines.141 The
following section will use virtual currencies to focus on the final
two questions: When must futures exist (Today? In the future?)
and should futures in one unenumerated commodity (bitcoin)
meet the futures requirement for potential commodities with similar characteristics (other virtual currencies)?142
C.

How Bitcoin Teaches Us to Interpret the Commodity
Definition

No one can seriously argue today that bitcoin is not a commodity,143 but we should not take its commodity status today as a
is unclear whether this language pertains to contracts for future delivery domestically or
worldwide.”) with CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at *11 n.13 (“Any futures contract, domestic or foreign, would be sufficient to bring virtual currencies within” the commodity definition.”).
140. Compare United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 695 n.11 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t
is at least open to question whether the CEA requires a commodity to be the subject of a
currently existing futures market, or merely that it be such a good for which a futures market
could come into being.”) with CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at *11 n.13 (“[A]
virtual currency is a commodity even if no futures contract is traded; all the statute requires
is that such a contract could ‘in the future’ be dealt in.”) (emphasis added). See also infra
notes 172-73, 180-81 and accompanying text.
141. Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (“By working through these examples of law interacting
with cyberspace, we will throw into relief a set of general questions about law’s regulation
outside of cyberspace.”).
142. For our purposes, I will assume that the futures requirement applies to both
catchalls. There is room for argument on this point but applying the requirement to both
catchalls is consistent with my view that, as a general matter, a connection to the futures
markets acts as a limit on both the commodity definition and CFTC jurisdiction.
143. See, e.g., Aron & Jones, supra note 124, at 1.
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vindication of the CFTC’s position that bitcoin was a commodity
in 2014. With respect to bitcoin, the debut of CFTC-regulated
bitcoin futures144 mooted the interpretive difficulties identified
above in connection with the CEA’s commodity definition.
Which catchall bitcoin falls under, whether the futures requirement applies to that catchall, what types of futures count, when
those futures must exist—bitcoin futures trading on the Cboe Futures Exchange in Chicago made all these questions irrelevant for
bitcoin. One important question remains, however: Why? The
facile answer is that contracts for future delivery in bitcoin now
“are presently . . . dealt in,” making application of the statute to
bitcoin as run-of-the-mill as application of the statute to natural
gas.145 That apparently straightforward conclusion would suggest, too, that the CFTC was right to claim bitcoin in 2014: If
bitcoin futures are presently dealt in today, were they not “in the
future dealt in” in 2014? But would that mean that hindsight creates commodities retroactively? Or that the commodity definition, the definition underlying regulation of the futures markets,
asks market participants, the CFTC, and the courts to predict the
future?
These questions arise from a misunderstanding of the text of
the statute, including its application to bitcoin: Bitcoin is not a
commodity because bitcoin futures “are presently . . . dealt in” but
because bitcoin futures are “in the future dealt in.”146 This is because, from the point of view of the Congress that enacted the
commodity definition in 1974, today is the future. The only contracts for future delivery “presently” dealt in, in the statute’s
terms, are futures that were trading when Congress passed those
words into law. Because Congress wanted to regulate more than
futures in existence in 1974, however, and wanted to do so without, as it had done in the past, passing a new amendment every
time the market created new futures products, it also included language to cover futures contracts created after the 1974
144. CFTC Statement on Self-Certification of Bitcoin Products by CME, CFE and
Cantor Exchange, CFTC No. 7654-17, 2017 WL 5952205 (Dec. 1, 2017). See also Colin
Lloyd and James Michael Blakemore, The Future Of Bitcoin Futures, LAW360 (Dec. 13,
2017), [https://perma.cc/CG2D-CRQB].
145. See infra text accompanying notes 185-192.
146. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9).
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amendments. Congress, seeking to do away once and for all with
an iterative approach to the commodity definition, amended the
definition to capture any “thing” for which futures trading existed
at that time (“presently”) or for which futures trading developed
“in the future.”147 The text speaks from the position of its enactment, and we are the 1974 act’s future.
This reading helps redeem §1a(9)’s awkward wording.148 A
statute that granted the CFTC jurisdiction over commodities for
which futures “are presently dealt in” would have left uncertain
the CFTC’s jurisdiction with respect to futures not yet envisioned
in 1974. Not wanting to limit the Commission’s jurisdiction to
things for which futures trading existed when the statute was enacted, Congress added “in the future dealt in.” This addition
achieves Congress’s goal of preventing the statute from being frozen in 1974 but creates the mirrored issue we’ve identified: If
misread to treat the 1974 amendment’s future (today) as the statute’s “present[],” §1a(9) seems nonsensically to ask its interpreters to foresee future futures.
Fortunately, this potential ambiguity is resolved by recalling
that the problem Congress was trying to solve was how to avoid
adding a commodity to the definition each time new futures trading arose. If futures trading arises in the future, Congress decided
in 1974, at that point the underlying thing will become a commodity, and without Congress having to say so each time. This
understanding of the CEA is also consistent with the Act’s focus
on the derivatives markets and reinforces the understanding that
the CFTC’s jurisdiction in every instance requires a connection to
those markets. Given that the definition of “commodity” requires
existing contracts for future delivery, the Commission’s authority
always depends on the existence of a futures market, even when
the CFTC is asserting its fraud and manipulation authority in the
spot markets.149
147. 7 U.S.C. § 1a(9).
148. See, e.g., Russo, supra note 137, at 58 n.3 (On the breadth of the futures requirement, “[a] literal reading of the [statute] is not particularly helpful.”).
149. See, e.g., JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 118, at 9 (“A fair reading of the . . .
definition suggests that, as for ‘all goods and articles . . . and all services, rights and interests,’ their status as statutory commodities does not emerge until they become the subject of
futures trading. . . . [This] illustrates an important principle of commodities regulation: its
interest is in a form of economic activity, rather than in the attributes or character of the
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Finally, this understanding has a third benefit: It salvages
§1a(9) from a reading that would render the statute absurd and the
definition superfluous. Taken to an extreme, a reading of the
commodity definition that asks its interpreter to predict potential
futures removes any limit from the CFTC’s jurisdiction. If the
definition requires only that contracts for future delivery of a potential commodity might one day exist, that such contracts be
merely conceivable, every “thing” will meet the commodity definition. But it cannot be that any “thing” for which a future futures market can be conceived is a commodity. If that were the
case, there would be no point in defining “commodity” at all.
Congress is of course free to enact broad definitions, but a definition without limits both serves no purpose and violates a basic
principle of statutory construction: To read any limits out of
§1a(9) would be to render it superfluous.150
III. REGULATION ABHORS A VACUUM: THE CFTC’S
CREEPING EFFORTS TO EXPAND ITS ALREADY
EXPANSIVE SPOT MARKET AUTHORITY
The CFTC has used virtual currency to erode two potential
limits on the new spot market authority Congress granted to the
Commission in Dodd-Frank. The first potential limit is the commodity definition explored above; the second is a reading of the
CEA that would limit the CFTC’s spot market anti-fraud powers
to claims of fraud-based manipulation—that is, spot market fraud
having a manipulative effect on the derivatives markets or, at a
minimum, on spot market prices (which, given the interconnectedness of the spot and futures markets noted above, is effectively
the same thing). Getting the commodity definition right is important not only because it underlies all of the CFTC’s powers
broadly but also because it specifically limits the CFTC’s antifraud power in the commodity spot markets (as the alleged fraud
must involve a statutory commodity). The commodity definition
itself also helps reinforce the second potential limit. The CEA
underlying subject. The economic activity in question is futures and commodity options trading . . . .”).
150. Cf. Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 519 U.S. 465, 472 (1997) (interpreting CEA in manner “consonant with the doctrine that legislative enactments should
not be construed to render their provisions mere surplusage”) (citations omitted).
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incorporates the futures markets into the definition of “commodity” and thereby ought to restrict the CFTC’s authority to actions
that may affect futures (or other derivatives) markets—the
CFTC’s primary area of responsibility. Instead, however, in two
early virtual currency cases, CFTC v. McDonnell151 and CFTC v.
My Big Coin,152 the CFTC has used virtual currency to advance
readings of the CEA that stand to remove any appreciable limits
from the CFTC’s anti-fraud authority in the spot markets.
Lest one dismiss as a strawman the extreme reading of the
CEA’s commodity definition that would find an asset to be a commodity so long as a futures contract in that asset is conceivable,
Part III.A reviews a recent CFTC statement in which the Commission took just this position. The CFTC subsequently doubled
down on the position in the virtual currency context by asserting
jurisdiction over bitcoin (and other virtual currencies) before U.S.
markets for bitcoin futures existed, including in federal court in
McDonnell, where unfortunately the court did not have the opportunity to rule on the effect of the absence of such futures on the
CFTC’s jurisdiction. Part III.B shows a second way that the
CFTC has used virtual currency to scrape away at the futures requirement: Whereas in McDonnell the CFTC successfully exerted
jurisdiction over bitcoin despite the nonexistence of bitcoin futures, in My Big Coin the Commission successfully exerted jurisdiction over a purported virtual currency for which futures contracts did not exist, basing its claim on the existence of bitcoin
futures. In other words, the CFTC has taken the position that an
asset meets the futures requirement of the commodity definition
either where futures contracts in the asset are merely conceivable
or where futures exist in a sufficiently similar asset.153 Finally,
Part III.C shows how the CFTC used virtual currency to push
aside the final candidate for a limit on its anti-fraud authority—
the requirement that the fraud bear some connection to the derivatives markets. Such a limitation makes structural sense—the
151. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 22829 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366, 367
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
152. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 496-97 (D. Mass. 2018).
153. See also infra notes 172-73, 180-81 and accompanying text.
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CEA first gave the CFTC anti-fraud powers in the spot markets
as a necessary supplement to its regulatory authority in the derivates markets—and prevents an absurd scenario in which the
CFTC enjoys broad, garden variety anti=fraud power divorced
from its core domain. Indeed, when it issued regulations implementing its post-Dodd-Frank spot market powers, the CFTC itself
suggested it would abide by such a limit. McDonnell and My Big
Coin proved otherwise. In My Big Coin in particular the CFTC
traveled far afield from its primary expertise and core mandate,
bringing an enforcement action in a case where no commodity
may have existed at all.
A. Leaving a Lot to the Imagination: The CFTC’s
Expansive Interpretation of the Commodity Definition
The CFTC’s espousal of the broad reading of CEA §1a(9)—
under which a commodity is any asset for which futures contracts
are merely conceivable—predates the Commission’s assertion of
authority over virtual currencies. In a 2010 “Statement of the
Commission” approving futures and option contracts on motion
picture box office revenues, the CFTC saw no limit to the phrase
“in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt in,” interpreting it to mean “all futures trading that
might now exist or might develop in the future.”154 In other words,
the CFTC took the position that “Congress intended for the CFTC
to regulate futures and options on ‘all commodities, goods, articles, services, rights, and interests which are or may be the subject
of futures contracts.’”155 If you can imagine a futures contract on
a thing falling into one of those enumerated categories, never
mind whether such a contract does or will ever exist, then, in the
154. CFTC, Approval Letter on Media Derivatives, Inc., Contracts, at 2 (June 14,
2010) (emphasis added), [https://perma.cc/6ZZ3-X8V5] [hereinafter MDEX Statement].
The attentive reader will have noticed that the approval of futures contracts in box office
receipts contradicts §1a(9)’s exception of such receipts. That exception was added by DoddFrank, two months after the MDEX decision, in response to pressure from, among others,
the Motion Picture Association of America. Felix Salmon, Trading in Fantasy, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2010), [https://perma.cc/6HT9-2UJU]. That Congress outlawed box office futures
in part by excepting box office receipts from the commodity definition, along with Congress’s similar move in connection with onions, is one more signal of Congress’s intention
to limit commodities to things for which futures exist.
155. MDEX Statement, supra note 154 (emphasis added).
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CFTC’s view, the thing meets the statutory definition of “commodity.”156
The MDEX Statement’s reading only narrowly carried the
day, however: Two of the CFTC’s five commissioners dissented
precisely on the grounds that Congress could not have intended
the statutory definition of “commodity” to be boundless. For
Commissioner Jill Sommers, “[w]hile the [CEA’s] definition of
‘commodity’ is rather broad, it is not without limits.”157 Some
things do not “fit neatly or cleanly within” the statutory definition
because they are not, in fact, commodities, and where a thing’s
place in the statute is not clear, the CFTC has an obligation to
carefully consider whether it has the power to regulate it.158 And
Commissioner Bart Chilton rejected as “circular” the argument
that “because one can develop a futures contract, the [thing] underlying [the hypothetical contract] is a ‘commodity.’”159 “Using
this analysis,” he reasoned, “anything under the sun could be a
commodity if you could, at some time in the future, have a futures
contract on it.”160 Read this broadly, “the statute is meaningless.”161
Yet the broad interpretation of §1a(9) is in the CFTC’s institutional interest. To date the CFTC has sought to use the broad
156. The human imagination is, of course, famously limitless. See, Lynch, supra note
51, at 551 (“[T]he set of metrics, values, or events which can [underly a derivative contract]
. . . are infinite.”). Examples of exotic derivatives include those which reference the price of
greenhouse gas emission permits, the value of mortgage-backed securities, unemployment
rates, election results, the occurrence of terrorist attacks, and the discovery of aliens. Id. at
551-52. Among the examples of futures contracts that can be imagined, but which the CFTC
is nonetheless unlikely ever to authorize, are contracts on the likelihood of the death of public
figures and of “UFOs hitting the White House.” Commissioner Bart Chilton Dissent from
Approval of Media Derivatives Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option Contract, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31, 593, 2010 WL 11242505
(June 14, 2010) [hereinafter, Chilton Dissent]. The world of virtual currency provides its
own example of derivatives contracts the CFTC is unlikely ever to approve—assassination
contracts on a virtual currency-based prediction market called Augur—that reportedly have
drawn the CFTC’s attention. Matthew Leising, As Crypto Meets Prediction Markets, Regulators Take Notice, BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2018), [https://perma.cc/6FB9-ACEZ].
157. Dissent of Commissioner Jill E. Sommers from Approval of Media Derivatives
Exchange’s Opening Weekend Motion Picture Revenue Futures and Binary Option Contracts, Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 31,594, 2010 WL 11242506 (June 14, 2010) [hereinafter, Sommers Dissent]. See also Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.
158. Sommers Dissent, supra note 157; see also Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.
159. Chilton Dissent, supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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interpretation to sweep virtual currency in under its authority, and
to use virtual currency to bolster the broad interpretation. An expanded commodity definition spells expanded jurisdiction for the
Commission and further justification for its existence and funding.162 A definition that encompasses strange, new, high-profile
assets attracts attention to the agency and emphasizes the definition’s purported breadth; it helps protect an agency from blame if
things go wrong in—and makes for easy enforcement against unsophisticated, unsympathetic fraudsters taking advantage of—an
ebullient new market. By declaring future-less virtual currencies
to be commodities, as the CFTC first did in 2014 when federally
regulated bitcoin futures existed only in the imagination,163 the
CFTC further normalized the view that commodities are commodities regardless of the existence of a futures market. It also
set the stage for conspicuous enforcement actions based on the
broad view of the definition: U.S. bitcoin futures had only existed
for a month when, in a much reported on case, CFTC v. McDonnell,164 the CFTC brought an enforcement action alleging bitcoinrelated violations of the CEA between January 2017 and January
2018.165
The McDonnell defendant broadly contested the CFTC’s jurisdiction over virtual currencies166 but missed an opportunity to
put before a federal court the more difficult question of the limits
of the definition of commodity that we have been discussing. Not
only does a maximalist reading of §1a(9), as noted above, make
for easier enforcement, but enforcement against unsophisticated
162. See William P. Albrecht, Regulation of Exchange-Traded and OTC Derivatives:
The Need for a Comparative Institution Approach, 21 J. CORP. L. 111, 121-22 (1995) (noting
regulators’ incentives to please Congress by, among other things, expanding their domain).
163. Massad Testimony, supra note 27. Note that Chairman Massad pointed to bitcoin
derivatives, in existence at the time, as one area of the CFTC’s authority. The derivatives in
question, however, were not “contracts for future delivery,” as required by the plain language
of §1a(9), but bitcoin swaps and options. 7 U.S.C. §1a(9) (2010); see also CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 100; TeraExchange, supra note 29, at *1-2. Note, too, that the CFTC
has suggested that “contracts for future delivery” in bitcoin dealt in on foreign boards of
exchange suffice for purposes of the definition. See CFTC McDonnel Brief, supra note 137,
at 12.
164. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 222
(E.D.N.Y 2018).
165. Complaint at 2, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.
Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-0361).
166. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 217.
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fraudsters can also make it easier to obtain court orders supporting
a maximalist reading—in particular where defendants opt to proceed pro se. The occasional tendency of enforcement actions to
pit a government litigator against a pro se defendant is, in this
sense, in the regulator’s interest, though it means courts are less
likely to hear the best arguments on both sides of an issue.167 In
the case of McDonnell, while federally regulated futures existed
when the CFTC filed the case, for nearly all of the period in which
the CFTC alleged misconduct they did not.168 The court should
have been asked to consider the point at which bitcoin became a
“commodity” under the CEA—whether due to bitcoin futures
available abroad169 or by finding that bitcoin futures were “in the
future dealt in” at some point in 2017. It might have made a difference: The district court relied in part on the quite recent existence of futures trading in bitcoin to conclude that bitcoin met the
statutory definition of a commodity, despite the fact that those futures had been certified only a little over a month before the CFTC
filed its complaint.170 As it stands, bitcoin’s novelty, its suspect
status, and the unrepresented, unsophisticated, and unsympathetic
defendant the CFTC chose to pursue in McDonnell all helped the
CFTC succeed in bringing an action advancing its position in
MDEX that an asset is a commodity so long as its futures can be
imagined.

167. See, e.g., Memorandum, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Directions
for Final Judgment and Injunction at 6, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell,
287 F. Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y 2018) (No. 18-CV-361) (“The litigation has been particularly
difficult to administrate because McDonnell has appeared pro se despite various attempts of
the court to explain why he needs counsel. He has appeared in court intermittently.”); Complaint at 1, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., 2017 WL
4228737 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (No. 17-7181) (pro se defendant in CFTC suit alleging bitcoin
Ponzi scheme not involving futures contracts). Cf. James Blakemore, Counsel’s Control
over the Presentation of Mitigating Evidence During Capital Sentencing, 111 MICH. L. REV.
1337, 1357-59 (2013) (discussing, in the criminal context, the paramount importance of involvement of counsel).
168. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 222; Complaint at 1, McDonnell 287 F. Supp.
3d 213 (No. 18-CV-0361).
169. See CFTC McDonnell Brief, supra note 137, at 12 n.13 (suggesting “contracts for
future delivery” in bitcoin dealt in on foreign boards of exchange suffice for purposes of the
definition).
170. See McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d at 222, 227-28. (noting CFTC-regulated bitcoin
futures and the principle that existence of futures market underlies CFTC jurisdiction).
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My Big Coin Has No Futures: Why Bitcoin’s Should
Not Be Enough

Virtual currency’s usefulness to the CFTC as a way to
stretch—and even erase—the boundaries of the commodity definition did not end with bitcoin. Bitcoin was not born a commodity. It became one, sometime between its 2008 genesis and the
December 2017 certification of the first federally regulated
bitcoin futures.171 Tracing how it did so helps trace the outside
bounds of the CFTC’s authority. As a completely new form of
asset in which futures trading had not had the opportunity to develop, bitcoin gave the CFTC the chance to promote the idea that
its jurisdiction is based in all things, not solely things underlying
futures contracts. Now that bitcoin’s status as a commodity is
clear,172 it is no longer, in that sense, useful to the CFTC. But
bitcoin, of course, is far from alone. Thousands of other virtual
currencies exist, the majority of which do not underlie U.S.-regulated futures contracts, and new virtual currencies with exotic features could be created at any moment.173 As an alternative to its
argument that CEA §1a(9) does not require futures trading to find
a commodity, the CFTC has taken the position that bitcoin futures
are enough to bring all other virtual currencies within the definition. In this way, the CFTC has begun to use virtual currencies in
a different way to say the same thing it said in bitcoin’s case: The
commodity definition’s futures requirement—at least for virtual
currencies going forward—is no requirement at all.
The CFTC has claimed virtual currencies as commodities for
as long as it has claimed bitcoin, issuing statements and obtaining
rulings that conflated, with inadequate support, bitcoin’s regulatory status with that of other virtual currencies. From the beginning, the agency saw bitcoin as a specific example of a general
category—virtual currencies—within its purview.174 But, as we
171. Lee Reiners, Bitcoin Futures: From Self-Certification to Systematic Risk, 23 N.C.
BANKING INST. 61 (2019).
172. See, e.g., Aron & Jones, supra note 124.
173. Nathan Reiff, The 10 Most Important Cryptocurrencies Other Than Bitcoin,
INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 8, 2020), [https://perma.cc/S8GX-A2EG] (including ether, XRP, litecoin, tether, and Monero). See also CoinMarketCap, coinmarketcap.com (listing more than
2,500 individual cryptocurrencies).
174. Massad Testimony, supra note 27. See also Justin S. Wales, Richard J.
Ovelmen, Bitcoin Is Speech: Notes Toward Developing the Conceptual Contours of Its
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have seen, that self-serving interpretation of the law was not selfevidently correct, not least because the CFTC claimed bitcoin and
other virtual currencies long before federally regulated futures
contracts existed for those assets.175 In its first settled enforcement actions, the CFTC stated that bitcoin’s commodity status
and that of other virtual commodities were one and the same.176
And in McDonnell, the CFTC obtained a ruling that not only
bitcoin, but all virtual currencies are commodities subject to the
CEA.177 The McDonnell court should not have purported to go so
far. Only the commodity status of bitcoin and litecoin, a bitcoin
clone, were squarely before the court.178 Moreover, just as the
McDonnell court did not reckon with the absence of U.S.-regulated bitcoin futures during most of the time over which the CFTC
sought to impose its authority, despite ostensibly basing CFTC
jurisdiction on the existence of a futures market in bitcoin,179 the
court also did not have opportunity to consider what effect the
lack of futures contracts for other virtual currencies might have
on their commodity status.180 Said differently, if futures contracts
for one of the thousands of other virtual currencies do not exist,
is the virtual currency nevertheless, consistent with the CFTC’s

Protection Under the First Amendment, 74 U. Miami L. Rev. 204, 266 (2019) (noting a
general tendency among regulators not “to draw distinctions among different types of cryptocurrencies”).
175. Notably, in October 2019, CFTC Chairman Heath P. Tarbert claimed the virtual
currency ether, arguably the second most important virtual currency after bitcoin, as a commodity, despite the current lack of ether futures. According to Chairman Tarbert, ether is a
commodity because it is not a security (implying that anything that is not a security is a
commodity) and because it is a commodity, the CFTC will soon greenlight ether-based futures contracts. Press Release, CFTC, Chairman Tarbert Comments on Cryptocurrency Regulation at Yahoo! Finance All Markets Summit (Oct. 10, 2019), [https://perma.cc/3TN8RTV3]. This analysis puts the cart before the horse. Futures trading is not permitted to debut
because something is a commodity; instead, futures trading, as a statutory matter, creates the
commodity. Unless bitcoin futures are shown to meet the statutory definition of “commodity” with respect to ether, the absence of ether futures contracts suggests that ether is not a
commodity and will not become one unless and until trading in ether-based futures begins.
176. Coinflip, supra note 28, at *2 (“Bitcoin and other virtual currencies are . . .
properly defined as commodities.”); Bitfinex, supra note 30, at * 5.
177. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 22728 (E.D.N.Y. 2018).
178. See id. at 232.
179. See id. at 227-29.
180. See generally id.
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stated position, a “commodity” under §1a(9), and subject to the
CFTC’s oversight, thanks to bitcoin futures?
CFTC v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. asked a federal court to decide this very question: Did the virtual currency in question, a virtual currency called My Big Coin (MBC), come within the commodity definition by virtue of the existence of bitcoin futures and
despite the lack of futures traded in MBC?181 In My Big Coin, the
CFTC alleged that the defendants had used false statements to induce customers to buy MBC and had invented and artificially
changed the price of MBC to make it appear that MBC was being
actively traded.182 In response, the defendants pointed to the lack
of MBC-specific futures to argue that MBC did not meet the statutory definition of commodity and that, as a result, the CFTC’s
authority did not reach their alleged conduct.183 The CFTC replied that contracts for future delivery of virtual currencies existed—bitcoin futures—and that therefore the specific virtual currency MBC was a commodity.184
The court sided with the CFTC, giving CEA §1a(9) a dubious reading that threatens to render the commodity definition a
nullity.185 On the theory that the statute defines commodities by
category rather than “by type, grade, quality, brand, producer,
manufacturer, or form,” the court reasoned that Congress intended the futures requirement to apply to general categories like
“livestock.”186 In other words, if futures traded in one form of
livestock but not another—swine, say, but not cattle—cattle
would nonetheless qualify as a commodity on the basis of swine
futures. With respect to MBC, the theory goes, futures contracts
existed for the category “virtual currencies” by virtue of bitcoin
futures and, as a specific example of a virtual currency, MBC
qualified as a commodity as a result. This textual reading, however, proves both too little and too much. Too little, because the
statute does not always speak categorically (surely “butter” and
181. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d
492, 495-96 (D. Mass. 2018).
182. Id. at 494.
183. Id. at 496.
184. Id. at 496-97.
185. See id. at 496-98.
186. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 3d, at 496-97.
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“eggs” are “livestock products,” yet the statute lists all three).
Too much, because “virtual currencies,” unlike “livestock,” do
not appear in the statute. Virtual currencies, as we have seen,
must therefore fall under a catchall category like “goods.” And,
taking goods as an example, for reasons elaborated above, it cannot be that a futures contract in one good makes all goods commodities.187 Instead, the statute means what it says: Only goods
in which futures contracts are dealt are commodities; other goods
are not.
The problem then becomes one of choosing a level of generality for the class of assets underlying the contracts for future
delivery necessary to the commodity definition. “Goods” plainly
is too broad a category. The My Big Coin court’s chosen analogy
(the best the “scant caselaw on this issue” had to offer) was natural gas.188 In support of its holding that “virtual currency” is an
appropriate category under §1a(9), the My Big Coin court cited
cases holding natural gas to be a sufficiently narrow category for
the definition.189 Natural gas is an asset, like virtual currencies,
not enumerated in §1a(9), and the cases cited by the court considered whether futures contracts in natural gas delivered at one location sufficed to bring natural gas delivered at another location
within §1a(9)’s commodity definition.190 But the outcome in
those cases is as obvious there as it is unpersuasive here. As noted
in the natural gas cases,191 natural gas delivered at one location is
fungible with natural gas delivered at another, and §1a(9) requires
only that contracts for future delivery exist, not that they exist

187. See id.
188. Id. at 497.
189. Id. at 497-98.
190. Id. at 497 (internal citations omitted); United States v. Futch, 278 F. App’x 387,
395 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03-024, 2003 WL 23174749,
at *8 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003), vacated in part on other grounds, No. CRIM.A. H-03-024,
2003 WL 23675402 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 394 F.3d 352 (5th
Cir. 2004).
191. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 695 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[I]t would be peculiar that natural gas . . . ceases to be a commodity once it moves onto some other locale. . . .
[T]he actual nature of the ‘good’ does not change.”); Futch, 278 F. App’x at 395 (finding
“frivolous” the argument that natural gas is not a commodity when delivered to a location
other than that specified in natural gas futures contracts, as the contractual specification of
delivery “does not in any way limit the type of commodity in question, natural gas.”); Valencia, 2003 WL 23174749, at *3, *8 (“All agree that natural gas is essentially fungible.”).
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everywhere the commodity is to be delivered. The level of generality makes sense—natural gas futures are natural gas futures,
wherever the underlying gas is delivered—whereas a higher level
of generality—extractive resources, say—would be less convincing. That is, the courts in the natural gas cases would more likely
have rejected an argument that gold futures, or even oil futures,
would have pulled natural gas into the commodity definition on
the basis that all such assets are pulled from the ground. Nonetheless, the My Big Coin court found the analogy persuasive.
Virtual currencies are new and complex enough that they are
still not well understood, making the appropriate level of generality difficult to determine. But there’s no clear reason to think
that bitcoin’s categorization should bear decisively on that of
other virtual currencies. Bitcoin itself is unlike any asset that
came before it.192 And while other virtual currencies may share
some characteristics with bitcoin, typically in particular some aspects of their underlying technology, it has yet to be shown that
their similarities warrant treating futures in bitcoin effectively as
futures in all virtual currencies. Virtual currencies number in the
thousands, have diverse designs and uses, and generally are not
fungible among themselves.193 If fungibility is the test, virtual
currencies fail it. Fungibility aside, the variety among virtual currencies is at least as great as among extractive resources.194 At a
minimum, consistent with Congress’s purpose in drafting §1a(9)
in the manner it did, courts should ask whether a potential commodity has the potential to substantially influence the price of
contracts for future delivery that are presently dealt in. This
standard, it is worth noting, would have required the same
192. See Katie Szilagyi, supra note 12, at 16 (“Bitcoins are something new: they have
no physical analogues.”). See also CFTC, Advisory with Respect to Virtual Currency Derivative Product listing, CFTC Staff Advisory No. 18-14 (May 21, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/6R2W-Y6GE]
(“Virtual currencies are unlike any commodity that the CFTC has dealt with in the past.”).
193. See Goforth, supra note 12, at 1 (noting existence of “more than 2000 different
active coins and tokens[,]. . . some . . . clearly . . . designed to serve [as] . . . currencies . . . ,
many . . . with additional functionality in mind.”); see also Shakow, supra note 16, at 1,
6(“[T]he rights and powers represented by these tokens are not uniform. As a result, there is
no single answer as to how tokens should be treated for tax purposes.”). But see Hazen,
supra note 12, at 9 n.35 (“[C]rypto currencies clearly fall within the definition of commodity.”).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 191-92.
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outcome in the natural gas cases (that is, that natural gas is a commodity regardless of the place of delivery specified in the existing
natural gas futures contracts), and in at least one of those cases
the defendant was explicitly attempting to influence the futures
markets through false reporting in the spot market.195 It may be
the case that virtual currencies generally also have this potential
with respect to bitcoin futures,196 but the point is that the variances
among virtual currencies suggest that courts should consider the
potential commodity status of each individual virtual currency.
As we will see below, MBC is especially unlikely to have passed
such a test.197
In My Big Coin, in addition to holding a fraudster accountable, the CFTC landed an additional blow to the limits of the commodity definition, adding another yard to the agency’s creeping
expansionist project. My Big Coin identified no principles for determining the appropriate level of generality, going forward, of a
futures contract for a new class of assets to meet the commodity
definition.198 The holding contributes to the erosion of §1a(9) by
leaving the door open for ever broader category claims, all but
inviting the CFTC or private litigants to argue that every new
“good” or “service” is automatically a commodity because contracts for future delivery trade in other goods and services. With
bitcoin, as we have seen, the CFTC has long claimed—and in enforcement actions acted on the claim—that contracts for future
delivery need only be conceivable for jurisdiction to lie; no futures need actually exist. In arguing that all virtual currencies,
195. Brooks, 681 F.3d at 684-85 (defendants violated CEA by attempting to manipulate natural gas spot market prices in order to affect prices of natural gas futures); see also
Futch, 278 F. App’x at 390 (defendant attempted to manipulate natural gas spot market prices
that also affect the price of natural gas futures contracts); Valencia, 2003 WL 23675402, at
*3 (futures contracts prices established with reference to “point of departure” spot market
index prices). To be clear, this standard would not require that the manipulative activity
actually manipulate futures prices, only that it could. The manipulation of spot market prices
is sufficient to violate the CEA and was so even before Dodd-Frank. 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2)
(2010); 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
196. See, e.g., Carol Gaszcz, Bitcoin Exhibits the Highest Correlation with Other Cryptocurrencies – Report, THE BLOCK (March 21, 2019), [https://perma.cc/WUQ4-M8NC] (reporting correlation among prices of bitcoin and other virtual currencies and bitcoin’s status
as “the bellwether of the industry”).
197. See infra text accompanying notes 218-220.
198. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc. et. al., 334 F.
Supp.3d 492, 496 (D. Mass. 2018).
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whatever their design, purpose, and function, are commodities
merely by virtue of the existence of futures in bitcoin, the CFTC
makes the same argument in a new form: When it comes to new
assets like virtual currencies, the futures requirement is no requirement at all.
C.

Virtual Currency and the CFTC’s Case for Stand-Alone
Anti-fraud Power

In addition to helping to blur limits in the commodity definition, virtual currencies have proven useful to the CFTC’s efforts
to expand its domain in the spot markets in another way. Specifically, McDonnell and My Big Coin gave the agency the opportunity to advance an expansive view of the Commission’s power,
following Dodd-Frank, to bring spot market fraud cases unconnected to its traditional realm of oversight, the futures and derivatives markets. Dodd-Frank’s legislative history demonstrates
that Congress had a narrower intent: to expand the CFTC’s power
to police and deter manipulation, including fraud-based manipulation, in the commodity spot markets.199 Nonetheless, the language Congress copy and pasted from the Exchange Act is arguably broader than that intent and the CFTC and, more recently,
several courts have read it to empower the prosecution of standalone fraud in addition to manipulation.200 Fears that importing
the SEC’s §10(b) powers might unintentionally expand the
CFTC’s powers in unforeseen ways in fact had scuttled previous
explorations of the idea, but intervening years and a financial crisis shunted those concerns aside.201
Whatever Congress’s intent, when, in Dodd-Frank, Congress incorporated the language of §10(b) of the Exchange Act
into the CEA in the form of CEA §6(c)(1), it opened the door for
the CFTC to explore not only its new anti-manipulation powers
but any others the language might arguably confer. CEA
§6(c)(1)’s language, appearing under the title “Prohibition regarding manipulation and false information,” is nearly identical to that
199. 156 CONG. REC. S5870, 5906, 5924 (daily ed. July 15, 2010).
200. See, e.g., My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 344 F.Supp. 3d at 499 (“[I]solated statements in
the legislative history . . . suggest[ing] Congress was, perhaps, principally concerned with
combating manipulation . . . are insufficient to overcome the broad language in the statute.”).
201. See Verstein, supra note 52, at 463-64.

2020

NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN

247

of Exchange Act §10(b) (titled “Manipulative and deceptive devices”):
CEA
§6(c)(1):

Exchange
Act
§10(b):

IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, TO USE OR EMPLOY . . .
IN CONNECTION WITH any swap, or a contract of

sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or
for future delivery . . . ANY MANIPULATIVE OR
DECEPTIVE DEVICE OR CONTRIVANCE.202
IT SHALL BE UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY . . . [T]O USE OR EMPLOY,
IN CONNECTION WITH the purchase or sale of any
security . . . or any securities-based swap agreement ANY MANIPULATIVE OR DECEPTIVE DEVICE
OR CONTRIVANCE.203

Building on the statutory language “deceptive device,” the SEC’s
rule implementing §10(b)—SEC Rule 10b-5—includes language
addressing fraud.204 When the CFTC promulgated regulations
implementing its own new anti-manipulation authority, it walked
through the door Congress had opened and modeled CFTC Rule
180.1 on SEC Rule 10b-5 and the wealth of case law interpreting
it.205 In adopting the rule, the CFTC noted that the U.S. “Supreme
Court has interpreted [Exchange Act §10(b) to have been] . . . ‘designed as a catchall clause to prevent fraudulent practices.’”206
The CFTC saw no reason to interpret CEA §6(c)(1) differently.
Presumptively aware of the Supreme Court’s views, the thinking
goes, Congress, by mimicking the language of the Exchange Act,
must not have intended to limit the CFTC’s authority to manipulative acts.207

202. 7 U.S.C. § 9(1) (2010).
203. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2010).
204. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(a) (2020).
205. 17 C.F.R. § 180.1(a) (2020).
206. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices; Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
207. 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,399 n.10 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263
(1952)) (“noting that where Congress borrows terms of art it ‘presumably knows and adopts
the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word.’”).
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The Exchange Act limits the SEC’s anti-fraud authority in
ways that the CEA does not similarly limit the CFTC’s anti-fraud
authority, and what limits potentially do exist the CFTC has set
about undermining. The SEC can only prosecute fraud perpetrated in connection with a transaction in securities.208 The CFTC
similarly can only prosecute fraud perpetrated in connection with
a commodity transaction, but, as we have seen, the CFTC has succeeded, thanks in large part to virtual currency, in stretching the
already taut commodity definition so thin that it can arguably be
draped over any “thing.”209 The final candidate for a meaningful
limit on the CFTC’s otherwise boundless power to prosecute
fraud is the potential that the CFTC’s anti-fraud authority is limited to fraud-based manipulation. This limitation makes structural and historical sense: The interplay between manipulation in
the derivatives and cash markets is the traditional rationale for the
CFTC’s spot market enforcement powers, and the historical realm
of the CFTC’s authority is the futures and derivatives markets.210
Fraud-based manipulation was also, for example, the manipulation prosecuted in the natural gas cases mentioned above.211
Moreover, a contrary interpretation, at the extreme, would
threaten to grant the CFTC “fraud jurisdiction over virtually every
commodity sale imaginable, including everyday grocery purchases”212—a ludicrous result for a relatively small agency whose
expertise and mandate centers on the vast and incredibly complex
derivatives markets.
The CFTC itself, when it promulgated Rule 180.1 interpreting these new powers, recognized that some limit on them was
appropriate:
208. See, e.g., Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (“[W]e are satisfied
that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.”). See also, Stassen, supra note 81 at 833 (“Even the SEC envied the
CFTC” for the expansive definition of commodity.).
209. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 344 F.Supp.
3d 492, 496 (D. Mass. 2018); see also supra text accompanying note 198.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
211. United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 687 (5th Cir. 2012) (defendants reported
false information regarding spot prices to manipulate index prices); see also United States v.
Futch, 278 F. App’x 387, 390 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Valencia, No. Civ.A. H-03024, 2003 WL 23174749, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 25, 2003).
212. See Defendant-Appellees Answering Brief at 2, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815).
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[A]lthough CEA section 6(c)(1) and final Rule 180.1 give
the Commission broad enforcement authority to prohibit
fraud and manipulation in connection with a contract of sale
for any commodity in interstate commerce, the Commission
expects to exercise its authority under 6(c)(1) to cover transactions related to the futures or swaps markets, or prices of
commodities in interstate commerce, or where the fraud or
manipulation has the potential to affect cash commodity, futures, or swaps markets or participants in these markets. This
application of the final Rule respects the jurisdiction that
Congress conferred upon the Commission and fulfills its
core mission and the purposes of the Act to protect market
participants and promote market integrity.213

The CFTC understood its new powers as a supplement to its traditional authority. It would prosecute activity that threatened to
disrupt derivatives markets or to affect the spot market price of a
commodity. That is, the CFTC “expected” to honor congressional intent and the overall structure of the CEA by limiting its
enforcement activity to manipulation or fraud related to futures or
swaps markets or that has the potential, bearing in mind the interrelatedness of prices in the spot and derivative markets, to affect
prices in the commodity markets.214
The CFTC did not meet its own expectations. As we have
seen, in McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC resisted one potential limit to its fraud power—the commodity definition—by
advancing attenuated readings of the futures requirement in
§1a(9)’s commodity definition. In McDonnell, the CFTC successfully exercised jurisdiction over bitcoin-related activity before the advent of contracts for future delivery of bitcoin in the

213. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,399 (July
14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
214. As the CFTC suggests, these limitations track the CEA’s findings and purpose.
See 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Manipulation, it is worth noting, is a grave concern in the virtual
currencies markets. See, e.g., Hazen, supra note 12, at 521-22 (“Virtual and crypto currencies are particularly ripe for manipulation.”); see also, John M. Griffin & Amin Shams, Is
Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?, SSRN (Oct. 28, 2019), [https://perma.cc/24UV-5FBP] (finding support for the view that “price manipulation can cause substantial distortive effects in
cryptocurrencies” and that virtual currency market prices “reflect much more than standard
supply/demand and fundamental news”).
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United States215 and, in My Big Coin, the CFTC undermined the
futures requirement from a different angle, convincing a court that
futures contracts in individual assets (bitcoin) satisfy the futures
requirement for broad categories of assets (virtual currencies).216
In those same cases, the CFTC also secured rulings adopting the
Commission’s evolved position that the CEA permits the CFTC
to bring fraud cases absent any claim that the alleged fraud affected futures, swaps, or other prices.217 First, in McDonnell, following a federal court’s holding that CEA § 6(c)(1) only prohibits
fraud connected to market manipulation,218 the defendant asked
the court to reconsider its motion to dismiss.219 On reconsideration, the court upheld its order denying the motion and adopted
the CFTC’s position that § 6(c)(1) empowers the CFTC to prosecute fraud absent any claims of manipulation.220
Second, My Big Coin provides a particularly stark example
of the distance the CFTC has traveled from its original position.
Above we observed that, at the time of the My Big Coin decision,
no contracts for future delivery of MBC existed.221 The CFTC,
logically then, did not allege that the fraud in question affected
nonexistent MBC futures. Nor did it allege, more broadly, an effect on the bitcoin derivatives market or the spot market price of
virtual currencies generally. The CFTC alleged simply that the
defendants were defrauding buyers of MBC, whom they convinced to purchase MBC with misrepresentations regarding its
uses and value.222 The CFTC’s concern in My Big Coin was not
with the derivatives markets, or the integrity of or prices in the
spot markets, so much as it was with protecting market participants bilked of their hard-earned money in the sale of a purported
215. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp. 3d 213, 217
(E.D.N.Y. 2018).
216. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d
492, 497 (D. Mass. 2018).
217. Id. at 498; McDonnell, 287 F.Supp. 3d at 229.
218. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1173,
1185-89 (C.D. Cal. 2018), rev’d and remanded, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019).
219. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 366-67.
220. Id. at 367-68.
221. See discussion supra Section III.B.; see My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp.3d at
496-97.
222. My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d at 494.
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commodity. But the Commission’s jurisdictional assertion appears to have gone farther afield than the already-contestable policing of stand-alone fraud: From the pleadings it is not clear that
MBC itself existed.223 In other words, not only was there no allegation that the defendants’ fraud affected derivatives or spot markets, or that MBC was arguably not a statutory commodity; MBC
also might not have been a commodity in the lay sense—a thing—
at all.
In McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC used virtual currency fraud as a testing ground for new theories about the breadth
of the Commission’s post-Dodd-Frank anti-fraud authority. Both
cases batted away the limit that Congress and the CFTC itself expected to check the CFTC’s fraud power—a broader effect on the
markets that make up the CFTC’s domain—but My Big Coin took
that limit-breaching to an extreme. In My Big Coin, the federal
derivatives watchdog seems to have prosecuted a fantasy, an invented product with no tangible connection to any of the markets
the CFTC oversees or, for that matter, any existence in reality. To
be sure, the fantasy was also a fraud, and defrauded investors deserve protection and recompense. But it’s not clear how the prosecution of a fantasy with no connection to derivatives or spot markets “respects” congressional intent, furthers the CFTC’s mission,
or appropriately deploys its expertise. To make an absurd but
telling comparison, would anyone worry that the fraudulent sale
of horses with false horns as “unicorns” might affect the futures
or spot prices of livestock? Would anyone believe that the CFTC
might appropriately prosecute such sales? As described, that scenario in fact has more to tie it to the CFTC’s area of authority than
did MBC: it at least involves real horses.
IV. A VIRTUAL CURRENCY USE CASE
The powers the CFTC argued for in the virtual currency context have implications beyond virtual currency. From broad public assertions of jurisdiction over virtual currencies, to
223. See, e.g., Amended Complaint at 8, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. My
Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d 492 (D. Mass. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv-10077-RWZ) (listing
among defendants’ alleged misrepresentations defendants’ claim that MBC “was a fullyfunctioning virtual currency that could be used to buy goods and services, and that was actively trading”).
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administrative actions exercising that jurisdiction over settling respondents, to successes in federal court, the CFTC lay and
stepped from one steppingstone to another not merely to claim
authority over virtual currencies, though those precedents of
course further that goal. The CFTC was also establishing increasingly authoritative interpretations of the CEA’s definition of
“commodity,” as well as its anti-fraud powers, for use in actions
beyond the sphere of virtual currency. No doubt the CFTC was
concerned with tackling fraud, and no doubt virtual currency’s
prominence in the news in recent years lent some cachet to the
agency’s actions, but these prominent and less challenging cases
gave the CFTC a chance to work out its arguments and lay steppingstones deeper in the pond to reach bigger—and more sophisticated, wealthier, better lawyered—fish. Virtual currencies’ intriguing novelty and complexity have made them a pliant tool for
testing and expanding agency powers.
Section IV.A looks beyond the CFTC’s early virtual currency actions to a non-virtual currency case in which the CFTC
has built on the expansive theory of stand-alone fraud authority it
tested and developed in the virtual currency arena. McDonnell
and My Big Coin set the stage for a major win for the CFTC in
the Ninth Circuit, which has helped to solidify the broad claims
the agency made in those cases. Section IV.B concludes by widening the lens to reflect on an irony peculiar to virtual currencies:
Virtual currencies, which arose in conscious contradistinction to
the traditional financial system and aimed to evade government
scrutiny and regulation, have so far ended up consistently augmenting the powers of U.S. regulators. The CFTC’s use of virtual
currency to put forward broad interpretations of its powers is not
unique to the Commission; instead, it is an emerging trend in the
story of bitcoin and virtual currencies generally.
A.

Beyond Bitcoin: How the CFTC Has Begun to Build on
the Expansive View of Its Anti-fraud Power Advanced
in Virtual Currency Cases

Whether or not McDonnell and My Big Coin were appropriate cases from jurisdictional and resource-allocation perspectives
for CFTC enforcement attention, from an institutional perspective
they were of significant benefit. First, the CFTC secured wins
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that, for their association with virtual currency, garnered press attention and that the CFTC could use to promote the agency.224
Second, and more importantly in the long term, in the slow accretion characteristic of the common law, McDonnell and My Big
Coin laid down the first layers of the foundation of the CFTC’s
new anti-fraud authority, unbound from both a meaningfully limited commodity definition and, significantly, from any connection
to price manipulation.
In the short time since, the CFTC has already begun to build
on this foundation. In July 2019, in CFTC v. Monex Credit Co.,225
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit became the first U.S.
Court of Appeals to squarely rule on the authority of the CFTC to
bring spot market fraud cases absent any claim of price manipulation. As in McDonnell and My Big Coin, the CFTC did not allege that the purported fraud had the potential to impact prices in
either the spot or derivatives markets. Monex differed from
McDonnell and My Big Coin in that it involved not virtual currencies but precious metals, but the legal issue—the breadth of the
CFTC’s anti-fraud power in the spot markets—was the same.226
And the Monex defendants, like the McDonnell and My Big Coin
defendants before them, argued that the CEA did not empower
the CFTC to bring stand-alone fraud claims.227 The CFTC lost in
the district court and appealed, and McDonnell and My Big Coin
were decided while the appeal was pending. On appeal, the CFTC
was able to point to McDonnell and My Big Coin to argue that the
district court’s limitation on the Commission’s jurisdiction was

224. In the Enforcement Division’s 2018 Annual Report, for example, the CFTC cited
McDonnell as one of two cases representing its “significant trial victories during the past
year.”
CFTC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT,
[https://perma.cc/3WT4-QYXU]; see also, e.g., Gabrial T. Rubin, Cryptocurrencies, Trading Scams Draw Increased Federal Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018),
[https://perma.cc/GCS4-ZVLF].
225. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966,
976 (9th Cir. 2019).
226. Compare id. at 996 with My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334 F.Supp. 3d at 494, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366, 366-67 (E.D.N.Y.
2018).
227. Compare Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 969 with My Big Coin Pay, Inc., 334
F.Supp.3d at 494, and McDonnell, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 366-67.
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both “incorrect and an outlier.”228 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
district court’s order and, in an unprecedented ruling, permitted
the CFTC’s expansive assertion of power in the commodity spot
markets.229 How persuasive the appeals court found the virtual
currency rulings, if at all, the decision does not make clear. But,
at a minimum, McDonnell and My Big Coin gave the CFTC the
chance to work out its expansive jurisdictional theories and two
precedents to build upon.
The debate before the Ninth Circuit pitted a plain reading of
the statute against a series of subtler, complex arguments from the
defendants. In the end, the appeals court gave CEA §6(c)(1) an
alluringly simple reading. Section 6(c)(1) prohibits the use of a
“manipulative or deceptive device” in connection with the sale of
a commodity.230 In the Ninth Circuit’s view, to read this prohibition to require fraud to have a manipulative effect would be to
hold “that ‘or’ really meant ‘and.’”231 The statute “means what it
says,” the court wrote, and the authorization to prosecute “manipulative or deceptive” conduct empowers the CFTC to prosecute
fraudulent practices whether or not those practices are also manipulative.232 The defendants’ counterarguments ranged from
textualist (plain meaning requires a reading of the statute as a
whole; the broad reading nullifies other provisions of the CEA)
to intent-based (the legislative history confirms that §6(c)(1) limits the CFTC’s power to fraud that has the potential to manipulate),233 and a full treatment of these arguments is beyond the
scope of this Article. But most forcefully the defendants warned
that severing the CFTC’s fraud power from manipulative effect
would grant the Commission far-ranging enforcement authority,
including potentially over everyday milk and egg purchases.234
So dramatic a recalibration of governmental powers, the defendants pointed out, typically requires a more explicit statement from
228. Reply Brief of Appellant at 2, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex
Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815).
229. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 977.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 975-76.
232. Id. at 976.
233. See Defendant-Appellees’ Answering Brief at 32-63, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-55815).
234. See id. at 2.
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Congress; Congress does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.”235
And the Ninth Circuit did not shy away from these seemingly absurd implications. While the appeals court made clear it did not
decide that issue—it limited its ruling to the sale of leveraged
commodities—it also disagreed with the Monex defendants that
inviting the CFTC into the checkout line clearly would “amount[]
to an elephant in a mousehole.”236 After all, the court noted, “[b]y
its terms, § 6(c)(1) applies broadly to commodities in interstate
commerce.” Perhaps the statute means what it says.237
By adopting the CFTC’s view of its own powers, the Monex
court significantly bolstered the CFTC’s burgeoning position,
alongside the SEC, as one of the primary federal policers of fraud
in the virtual currency markets. The positions the CFTC advocated in the virtual currency context gave it ground to stand on in
Monex; Monex gives the CFTC new ground, going forward, to
stand on in future virtual currency cases. No doubt this reciprocal, leapfrog building of precedent will continue. The CFTC and
its leadership have made clear their intention to prosecute fraud
in connection with the offer and sale of virtual currencies.238 Emboldened by a win at the appellate level, the CFTC is likely to
continue to step in to supplement the SEC’s anti-fraud enforcement actions in the virtual currency markets, even in cases that
are unlikely to have any effect, manipulative or otherwise, on the
virtual currency markets generally.
The ruling also paves the way for the CFTC to bring claims
of crypto-commodity insider trading. Until recently, the federal
commodity laws were widely understood not to provide for the
prosecution of insider trading,239 and this made intuitive sense to
many given the differences between securities and commodities

235.
236.
237.
238.

Monex Credit Co., 931 F.3d. at 977.
See id.
Id.
CFTC & SEC, JOINT STATEMENT FROM CFTC AND SEC ENFORCEMENT
DIRECTORS REGARDING VIRTUAL CURRENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2018)
[https://perma.cc/D979-XCBN]; Jay Clayton & J. Christopher Giancarlo, Regulators Are
Looking at Cryptocurrency: At the SEC and CFTC, We Take Our Responsibility Seriously.,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2018), [https://perma.cc/K4YW-SBJY].
239. Verstein, supra note 52, at 463.
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markets.240 Recall, however, that Congress modeled CEA
§6(c)(1) on Exchange Act §10(b), under which the SEC prosecutes not only fraud but also insider trading.241 When the CFTC
promulgated CFTC Rule 180.1, it had its eye on this aspect of the
amended law, stating in its comments to the final rule that “trading on the basis of material nonpublic information in breach of a
pre-existing duty . . . , or . . . trading on the basis of material nonpublic information that was obtained through fraud or deception,
may be in violation of final Rule 180.1.”242 In September 2018,
the CFTC also announced that it had established an insider trading
“task force” and brought an insider trading case under CEA
§6(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 180.1.243 Private litigants, though not
the CFTC, have already attempted to bring a virtual currency insider trading case under CEA §6(c)(1) and CFTC Rule 180.1.244
Monex’s holding is a prerequisite for both types of cases going
forward.
B.

Digital Metal’s Irony

Early claims that virtual currency was so innovative that it
lay outside all existing laws and regulations have proven to be
exactly wrong. Bitcoin, like Dodd-Frank, grew from the ashes of
the 2008 financial crisis.245 The architects of both Bitcoin and

240. See, e.g., Matt Levine, It’s Hard to Be an Insider in Oil, BLOOMBERG, (Oct. 24,
2018), [https://perma.cc/7HGJ-NGHD] (“Nobody has a fiduciary duty to oil. Oil has no insiders.”).
241. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997) (trading securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information obtained in violation of a duty “qualifies
as a ‘deceptive device’ under § 10(b)”).
242. Prohibition on the Employment, or Attempted Employment, of Manipulative and
Deceptive Devices and Prohibition on Price Manipulation, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,398, 41,4003
(July 14, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180).
243. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Charges Block Trade Broker with Insider Trading
(Sept. 28, 2018), [https://perma.cc/7833-DR9N].
244. See Berk v. Coinbase, Inc., No. 18-CV-01364-VC, 2018 WL 5292244, at *2
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2018) (dismissing insider trading claim on grounds that putative plaintiffs’ spot market commodity transactions, absent transactions in futures contracts, is insufficient to confer private right of action under the CEA).
245. PAUL VIGNA & MICHAEL J. CASEY, THE AGE OF CRYPTOCURRENCY 13 (2015)
(“Cryptocurrency’s rapid development is in some ways a quirk of history: launched in the
throes of the 2008 financial crisis, bitcoin offered an alternative to a system—the existing
financial system—that was blowing itself up. . . . Within a few years, an entire counterculture
movement formed around cryptocurrencies, and it has continued to revolve around them.”).
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Dodd-Frank meant to build a bulwark against future crises but did
so using distinct tools and according to radically different philosophies. Dodd-Frank’s drafters sought to avert future crises by
way of regulation aimed at the supposed causes of the Great Recession.246 Bitcoin and its progeny ostensibly rejected government intervention as part of the problem.247 Dodd-Frank sought
to restructure the financial system from within; Bitcoin sought to
create a new one to replace it. In the decade since the financial
crisis, virtual currency, celebrated as innovation existing outside
the mainstream financial system and beyond the power of government regulation, has begun to be domesticated by both.248 Not
only have regulators rejected claims that virtual currency lies beyond the law’s domain. They have also used virtual currency to
stretch its borders. The great irony is that bitcoin and other virtual
currencies, rather than resisting or escaping the traditional financial system and its regulation, are being used to expand regulators’ powers.
This is true beyond the CFTC. In the securities context, for
example, SEC Commissioner Hester Peirce has expressed anxiety
that the SEC’s approach to digital asset regulation to date has exhibited the tendency to stretch the borders of the SEC’s domain.
By issuing no-action letters to companies that, absent the black
mark of virtual currency, no one would have thought might be
issuing securities, the SEC, Commissioner Peirce worries, might
be “broadening the perceived reach of our securities laws,” rather
246. Underregulated derivatives markets, in particular derivates speculation outside of
organized exchanges, were a primary cause of the crisis. Stout, supra note 44, passim.
Dodd-Frank took aim at these causes specifically, id. at 4, but also granted the CFTC lessfocused, broad new anti-manipulation powers. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 74, at 39194.
247. DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 205-06; VIGNA & CASEY, supra note
245, at 13. Satoshi Nakamoto, bitcoin’s pseudonymous progenitor, infamously timestamped
the first block in the bitcoin blockchain with a January 2009 headline: “Chancellor on Brink
of Second Bailout for Banks.” Id. at 62-63. Bitcoin began with a dig at the global financial
system that seemed, at the moment of the timestamp, to be crumbling. See id. at 63.
248. See, e.g., VIGNA & CASEY, supra note 245, at 27. This evolution recapitulates the
early regulatory evolution of the internet. See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What
Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 505 (1999) (“Many believe that cyberspace
simply cannot be regulated. Behavior in cyberspace, this meme insists, is beyond government’s reach. The anonymity and multi-jurisdictionality of cyberspace makes control by
government in cyberspace impossible. The nature of the space makes behavior there unregulable.”).
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than sketching their limits.249 And it has been argued that the
SEC’s treatment of digital assets is expanding the definition of an
investment contract, away from the nuanced Howey test and toward a “maximalist” approach that would find a security “wherever investors who cannot fend for themselves need information
and protection.”250 We have seen some of the ways in which the
CFTC is similarly laying jurisdictional claim to virtual currency
even as the assets’ awkward fit enables the CFTC to push out the
boundaries of that jurisdiction. The CFTC has effectively taken
what one commentator memorably called “a sector created by and
for obsessively secretive cypherpunk libertarian cranks”251 and
transformed it into a tool for expanding the reach of the federal
government.
Something about virtual currency is bewitching.252 It’s novelty and inscrutability are a Rorschach test. Anti-government
types see it as an escape from a financial system beholden to incumbent banks and captured regulators. Regulators see in its irregular and shifting borders the substance of their regulation—a
commodity, a security, money transmission. Virtual currency
also garners media attention.253 The pro se defendant in McDonnell, alive to this temptation, claimed that in settlement negotiations the CFTC warned him that “The judge should take an interest in this case because of recent cryptocurrency headlines.”254

249. Hester M. Peirce, Comm’r Sec. Exch. Comm’n, How We Howey (May 9, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/4YRN-FL3H].
250. Hall, supra note 115, at 141. “And it is easy to find influential voices arguing that
SEC regulation of the technology is both inappropriate and potentially destructive of legitimate commercial value.” Id. at 138 (citing Token Taxonomy Act, H.R. 7356, 115th Cong.
(2018)).
251. Max Read, Facebook’s New Competition: The U.S. Dollar, N.Y. INTELLIGENCER
(June 18, 2019), [https://perma.cc/92Y2-6MLB].
252. See, e.g., Geoffrey F. Aronow, Is the CFTC Becoming the National Fraud Police?
The CFTC Goes All in on Policing Fraud in Virtual Currencies, 38 No. 3 FUTURES &
DERIVATIVES L. REP. NL 1, at 5-7 (referring to the “Siren Song of Virtual Currency” in
connection with possibility that “the CFTC could be overstepping the bounds of its jurisdiction” in virtual currency cases).
253. When, for example, the CFTC released its annual enforcement report for the 2018
fiscal year, the Wall Street Journal’s reporting led with the Commission’s virtual currency
efforts. Gabriel T. Rubin, Cryptocurrencies, Trading Scams Draw Increased Federal Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 5, 2018), [https://perma.cc/U5YE-UCTC].
254. Declaration in Support of Motion to Dismiss at 1, Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) (No. 18-CV-00361),

2020

NEW THINGS UNDER THE SUN

259

Headlines, in turn, attract voter and congressional attention, and
such attention brings funding. Federal agencies have to justify
their existence255 and easy wins against pro se defendants in cases
involving captivating subject matter are a quick contribution toward that goal.256
Of course, to be clear, none of this is to say the CFTC is
somehow acting inappropriately or unexpectedly, or that the
CFTC does not have an important role to play in the virtual currency markets. It’s a bad law that expects a regulator to police
itself, not a bad regulator. Clearly, the CFTC’s anti-manipulation
powers pre-Dodd-Frank were not up to the task. But if DoddFrank’s amendments truly gave the CFTC the limitless fraud
power it has been advocating for, the pendulum has swung too far
in the opposite direction. The possibility of a federal agency’s
unfettered power over an area perfectly within the police power
of the states257—run-of-the-mill fraud in connection with the sale
of goods—starts to make bitcoin’s “libertarian cranks” look like
they have a point. More conservatively, overbroad enforcement
powers can deter, or even lead to the mistaken prosecution of, legal activity,258 which in a nascent technological industry can hamper innovation.259 And the CFTC’s resources arguably can be
adhered to on denial of reconsideration, 321 F. Supp. 3d 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2018), ECF No. 181 (No. 18-00361).
255. This is a two-edged sword. Claiming jurisdiction over an area makes an agency
accountable for it. See, e.g., Aronow, supra note 252, at 5-7 (noting “the political risk that,
if a major fraud arises in an important commercial market, the Commission’s overseers in
Congress will hold it accountable for failing to root out misconduct occurring under its
watch.”). But see Hall, supra note 115, at 141 (noting risk that Congress will hold SEC
accountable for failure to push the bounds of its enforcement authority).
256. See, e.g., CFTC, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT 4,
[https://perma.cc/4JNQ-E4G2] (devoting significant portion of annual report to virtual currency initiatives and victories). See also CFTC Backgrounder, supra note 100 (noting that
“[t]he CFTC built into its 2018 Congressional budget request additional resources to
strengthen its technological and econometric resources to support its ability to oversee virtual
currency derivatives”).
257. Cf., e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 854 (2014) (“In our federal system,
the National Government possesses only limited powers; the States and the people retain the
remainder. The States have broad authority to enact legislation for the public good—what
we have often called a ‘police power.’”).
258. See Mission, Vision, and Values, CFTC, [https://perma.cc/H8T8-U6MB] (last visited Mar. 5, 2020).
259. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 115, at 141 (“[L]abeling a digital asset a security for
purposes of the federal securities laws is . . . effectively a death knell for the asset. . . .”).
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better used. With respect to an agency with fewer than 700 employees, specific expertise, and limited resources, the law should
guard against the temptation to focus on blockchain buzzwords
and easy, headline-grabbing wins against two-bit fraudsters, rather than on, say, the futures markets or the more than $400 trillion, systemically important swaps market the CFTC is charged
with regulating.260 Under the broad reading of the CFTC’s antifraud authority, these resource-allocation decisions are left entirely up to the agency.
CONCLUSION
Just over a decade ago, a computer scientist (or scientists)
calling himself (or herself or themselves) Satoshi Nakamoto released the Bitcoin protocol into the wild, ultimately attracting
countless adherents around the world and sparking thousands of
blockchain-based projects seeking to expand on aspects of Nakamoto’s vision or technology or both. As virtual currency markets
have grown and its uses have multiplied, regulators, courts, and
academics have started to query how the law should treat virtual
currencies, beginning with how it should classify them. The legal
conversation’s focus on classification has both produced and
blurred the way in which the CFTC, alongside other government
agencies, has capitalized on virtual currencies’ legal and ontological uncertainty to chip away at restraints on its jurisdiction and
build a foundation for broad interpretations of its power. In particular, settling defendants and unsophisticated, pro se defendants
facing serious fraud allegations have lent themselves to rulings
shoring up a reading of the CEA that would grant the CFTC potentially limitless power to police fraud. In its forays into the virtual currency space, the CFTC has successfully made the case that
its authority no longer requires any connection to the derivatives
markets: that a commodity is literally any “thing,” regardless of
whether futures contracts for that thing exist, and that any fraud
committed in connection with the sale of that thing in interstate
commerce, regardless of whether that fraud harms the commodity
markets, falls within the CFTC’s purview.
260. See Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 74, at 397-398; Q+A: Swaps, the Ag Committee and a $400 Trillion Market, REUTERS (Apr. 22, 2010).
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This Article also uses virtual currencies to point the way forward toward fertile ground for future scholarship. Its method was
to show how virtual currencies help expose unsettled questions of
commodities law and how the CFTC has used virtual currencies
to try to settle those questions with dubiously broad readings.
Many of these questions remain unsettled. It remains to be seen
whether virtual currencies represent rights or interests or are
themselves goods, whether futures contracts dealt in on foreign
boards of exchange satisfy the futures requirement, and how general a category of futures might satisfy the futures requirement for
an asset not enumerated in the commodity definition. Future articles will need to explore the ramifications of the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that the CFTC has stand-alone anti-fraud authority in the
commodity spot markets, whether the court rightly decided the
case in the first place, and what other powers enjoyed by the SEC
Dodd-Frank might have smuggled into the CEA. Finally, this Article leaves it to others to investigate the other ends to which the
CFTC and other government actors are putting this strange new
asset class.
The CEA’s encounter with virtual currencies is not the first
time the law has grappled with assets or circumstances that were
unforeseeable at the time the law was drafted, and it won’t be the
last. Addressing unforeseen factual circumstances is one of the
functions of the law. Novel assets provide regulators with an opportunity to push the limits of their powers, but they also provide
courts and scholars with a new lens through which to view familiar statutes. As entrepreneurs continue to search for virtual currency’s “killer app”—the use case that will demonstrate and ensure the innovation’s success—virtual currency’s novelty no
doubt will continue to teach us new ways to read old laws.

